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'

Those who deny that Ihe original meaning of the Second Amendment protected an
individual right to keep and bear arms on a par with the righls of freedom ojspeech, press,
and assembly no longer claim that the amendment refers only to a "collective right" of states
/0

maintain their mililias.

individuals,

was

Instead, they now claim thaI Ihe right, although belonging 10

conditioned all service in an organized militia. With the demise of organized

militias. they canlend, Ihe right losl any relevance 10 constitutional adjudication.

In this

Essay. I evaluate the case made for this histarical claim by Richard Uviller and William
Merkel in their book, The Militia and the Right to Arms, or, How the Second Amendment Fell
Silent. I also evaluate their denial that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment

protected an individual right to arms unconditioned on militia service. I find bolh claims in
consistent with the available evidence of original meaning and also, perhaps surprisingly,
Wilh existing federal law.

Who says that even heated conflicts over constitutional meaning can
never progress? Over the past ten years, the intellectual clash between those
who claimed that, at the time of the founding, the ''right to keep and bear
arms" protected by the Second Amendment was a "collective right" of the
states to preserve their militia and those who maintain instead that it origi
nally referred to an individual right akin to the others protected in the Bill of
Rights has been resolved.

That the individual right view prevailed defini

tively is evidenced by the fact that no Second Amendment scholar, no matter
how inimical to gun rights, makes the "collective right" claim any more. All
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now agree that the Second Amendment originally referred to the right of the
individual.!
Indeed. the fact that the collective right theory was once so confidently
2
advanced by gun control enthusiasts is on its way down the collective mem·
ory hole as though it had never been asserted. With its demise, the intellec
tual debate over the original meaning of the Second Amendment has turned
in a different direction. Although now conceding that the right to keep and
bear anns indeed belongs to individuals rather than to states, almost without
missing a beat, gun control enthusiasts now claim with equal assurance that
the individual right to bear anns was somehow "conditioned" in its exercise
on participation in an organized militia.
The "militia-conditioned individual right" theory represents an advance
for the anti-gun-rights position.

It obviates (a) the copious evidence. both

direct and circumstantial. that "the right to keep and bear arms" belonged to
individuals) and (b) the lack of any direct evidence that the Second
Amendment protected some sort of a never-very-well-specified power of
states, while (c) allowing opponents of gun rights to maintain, as they did
with the "collective right" theory. that the Second Amendment is irrelevant
to the constitutionality of modem gun laws. But is the theory supported by
the available evidence?
The latest to make this historical claim are Richard Uviller and William
Merkel.

]n their book, The Militia and the Right to Arms, or, How the
Second Amendment Fell Silent, Uviller and Merkel reject the collective right
theory and characterize the Second Amendment "right to keep and bear
arms" as an individual right.4 However, they further claim that, because the
right to arms may be exercised only while participating as part of an organ
ized militia,S its existence as a constitutional right is conditioned on the
continued existence of a well-regulated militia. With the demise of the or
ganized militia, so too has vanished the right to keep and bear arms. In their

I. The viewpoint of Uviller and Merkel is representative: "[W]e cannot jOin .. .in the
contention that the eonstillltional right to arms belongs to the states rather than to natural
persons.

. . This reading is, we
.

THE

think, misguided." H.RICHARD UViLLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL,

179
(2002).
2. E.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History ofthe Second Amendment,]1 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
]09, 408 (1998) (asserting that "to the extent original intent matters, the hidden history of the
THE MILITIA AND

RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT

Second Amendment strongly supports the collective

].

rights position").

For a succinct summary of this evidence, which has been developed by scholars over the past

Uniled SIl1fes v. Emerson, 270 F.]d 20], 236--59 (5th Cir. 2001).
4. UVtLLER & MERKEL, supro note I, at 2] ("From the text as well as a fair understanding of

ten or more years, sec

the contemporary ethic regarding arms and liberty, it

seems

to us overwhelmingly evident that the

principal purpose of the Amendment was to secure a pewnal, individual entitlement to the
possession and use of arms.").
5.

M at ]I

("To return to our central theme, then, the individual right to keep and bear anns

that is secured in the Second Amendment in our analysis is
context of service in state or federal

militia."),

a

right without application outside the
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words, "historical developments have altered a vital condition for the
,
articulated right to keep and bear anns.' 6
In this Essay. I will comment briefly on the authors' interpretive
methodology before moving on to discuss specific problems with their effort
to interpret the Second Amendment. One of the peculiarities of the modem
debate over the Second Amendment is its single-minded preoccupation with
the issue of original meaning or original intent. This is odd because, to my
knowledge, none of the right-limiting theorists are themselves originalists,
and consequently they would surely not limit, for example, their interpreta
tion of the First Amendment by its original meaning. But as the modem aca
demic debate over the Second Amendment is entirely a historical one, in this
Essay I limit my attention to this issue.
I will confine myself to evidence, some previously unconsidered in this
debate, that specifically disproves that the Second Amendment protected a
militia-conditioned individual right. I do not reiterate here the other direct
and circumstantial evidence that supports an individual, as opposed to a
"collective," right, but the full strength of the individual-right position cannot
fully be appreciated without taking that evidence into account. 7
L

The Authors' Originalism

Uviller and Merkel (hereinafter "the authors") are to be commended for
explicitly discussing their method of interpretation.s Few law professors and
even fewer historians so much as attempt this. Unfortunately, I found their
discussion of interpretation rather confused. Increasingly, originalists like
myself focus entirely on the original meaning of the text-the meaning that a
reasonable speaker of the language would have attached to the words at the
time of the text's enactment.9 What did "militia" mean in 179 I? Or "well
regulated" or "arms" or "bear" or "right" or "the people"? Of course, speak
ers then, like speakers today, would be influenced by the context in which a
particular word or phrase is used. For example, because of the context of the
Second Amendment, we can be quite sure that the term "arms" refers to
weapons, not the appendages to which our hands are attached.
Discerning the original public meaning of the text requires an
examination of linguistic usage among those who wrote and ratified the text
as well as the general public to whom the Constitution was addressed.
6. ld. at 35.
7. See Emerson, 270 f.3d at 236-59 (surveying that other evidence).
8. VVILLER& MERKEL,supra note I,af 147-67.
9. I explain the version of originalism described in this Pan in RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTlnmON: THE PRESUMPTION OF UBERTY 89-130 (2004) [hereinafter
BARNETT, RESTORING"

There, I defend original-meaning originalism

as

entailed by the

commitment to a written constitution-a strucrural fearure of the U.S. Constirution (like federalism

or

separation of powers) that is needed to impose law on those who make, enforce, and interpret

legislation that they then impose on the citizenry. for a written constitution to fulfiUthe functiOn of
providing a higher law,its meaning must remain the same until it is properly changed.
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Evidence of specialized meaning or intent by framers or ratifiers is only
relevant if it is shown that such specialized meaning would have been known
and assumed by a member of the general public. Where more than one con
temporary meaning is identified, it becomes necessary to establish which
meaning was dominant.

Any such historical claim is an empirical one that

requires actual evidence of usage to substantiate. If possible, one should un
dertake a quantitative assessment to distinguish Donnal from abnormal
IO
usage.
Of course, once discerned, the original public meaning of the .text, like
the public meaning of laws enacted yesterday, must be applied to the facts of
particular cases.

Though general language of the sort

used

in the

Constitution may exclude many possible outcomes, often it does not dictate a
unique result, thus leaving to those actors that apply original meaning to par
ticular cases and controversies considerable discretion in developing legal
doctrines. This activity of applying meaning to cases by means of intennedi
ary doctrines is better described as constitutional cons/nlclion, rather than as
ll
interpretation of text.
The need for construction is Ihe unavoidable cost of
using language, especially general abstract language, to guide behavior. On
the other hand, the benefit of general language is that, even with no devialion
from its original meaning, it can last a very long time without becoming anti
quated.
Sometimes it sounds like the authors are endorsing an original-public
meaning approach, but that is not what they practice. In particular, the au
thors present very little evidence of the public meaning of the words used in
the Constitution and, where disagreement exists, little quantitative evidence
by which to distinguish dominant from deviant meaning. They seem instead
to be searching for what is better described as original intent, rather than
original meaning.
Those originalists who favor original intent want to fill the gaps in the
original public meaning and cabin the discretion of those engaged in con
struction of abstract provisions by appealing to the specific intentions of
those who either wrote or ratified them. This version of originalism has been

10. I ofef r elsewhere such a quantitative assessment of the meaning of the words "commerce"
and "regulate." Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence ofthe Original Meaning o/the Commerce C/Ollse,
55 ARK. L REv. 847 (2003); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning a/the Commerce C/OIIse, 68
U. CHI. L REV. 101 (2001) [hereinafter Barnett, The Original Meaning ofthe Commerce Clause].
Such a quantitative survey is not always possible, however, given the state of the evidence of the
particular word at issue. For example, the term "necessary" is too common to establish by
quantitative survey a dominant public meaning to which the Necessary and Proper Clause must
have refeHed. One must then fall back on more traditional reliance on statements of various
participants in the historical period about the clause in question. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The
Original Meaning ofthe Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183 (ZOO3) (analyzing
statements made by Madison, Hamilton, Jcfferson, Marshall, and others for evidence of the original
meaning of the words "necessary" and "proper").
I I. On the distinction between interpretation and construction, see BARNElT, supra note 9, at
118-30.
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I shall not repeat here, many of which I

think are sound.12 Given the fact that the Framers did not actually cantem·
plate most instances in which their words would be applied, in practice the
search for specific original intentions usually consists of what

I call

"channeling the framers" to discern what they ''would have" thought of a
particular case or controversy.

This converts originalism from a historical

and factual inquiry into a speculative and counterfactual one. There is sim
ply no factual answer to the question of what the founders

would have

thought of a particular matter. For this reason, such claims can neither be
empirically established nor refuted.
While in places. the authors appear to reject this approach-for

example, when they repeatedly cite the work of H. Jefferson Powell with

approval13-this rejection is not practiced consistently,14 as demonstrated by

their heavy and uncritical reliance on the works of such original-intent au
thors as Raoul Berger.15

The authors also seem to be unaware that the

historical evidence cited by Powell actually supports the conclusion that the

founding generation, while rejecting original-intent originalism, ended up

favoring original-meaning interpretation.16

Finally, in contrast with both original-meaning and original-intent

originalists, there are the new fangled "translation theory" originalists, such

as Larry Lessig and William Michael Treanor, who start with original

meaning or intent (it is not always clear which) to discern the principles un

derlying the text, and then purport to "translate" those principles-but not the
text itself-into the modem day context.11 While this does not sound like the

method that the authors endorse, nor practice in most cases, they nevertheless

cite Lany Lessig's work with approval without seeming to appreciate the

difference between his approach and that of other originalists.18
As

I said. their discussion of methodology is confusing, but perhaps no

more so than the well-known historian Jack Rakove, a nonoriginalist. whose
discussion of interpretive methodology the authors say they found heipful.19

12. Seeid. at 89-91,113-16.
13. UVTLLER& MERKEL. supra nOli:: I, a1148,154,296 n,6,299 n.36.
14. See, e.g., id. at 98 ("By inference, as well as from the record of debate in the House, the

process casts light on the Amendment's intended meaning.").

15.

See, e.g., id. at 205-06 (discussing

Berger's criticism of Professor Akhil Reed Amar's

thesis related to the Fourteenth Amendment's effect on the Second Amendment).
16. See BARNETT, supra note 9 ,at 94-100.
17. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REv. 395, 400 (1995) (arguing that the context in which text was created, along with the
wntext in which

text must be applied, should be considered in order to understand the text's

meaning); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding o/the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. l.

REv.

782, 859-80 (1995) (applying "translation theory" to the

Takings Clause).
18.

See UVILLER& MERKEL. supra nofe I, at 296 n,6.

19. The authors rely on Professor Rakove's work several times in the book. Id. at 80,177,246
n.9, 273 n.140,2 9 2 n.54.
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Uviller and Merkel seem not to realize that originalism has quite differing
and competing strains or, if they do, they do not consistently keep within one
method or another. Their erratic methodology renders it hard to respond to

their interpretive claims since they might, for example, present evidence of

intent that, while valid as far as it goes, is irrelevant to the public meaning of

the text or, at a minimum, is not dispositive.
As it tums out, the obvious source of this confusion siems from the fact
that the authors are not themselves originalists, although they never disclose
this to the reader.20 They therefore fall into the large class of nonoriginalists

who make originalist arguments, one assumes, to persuade others who care

more about original meaning than they do.

This probably describes every

opponent of the individual-rights interpretation of the Second Amendment

who offers historical evidence that this interpretation is in error.21 Even the

professional historians who insist on a crabbed originalist interpretation of
the right to bear arms, a right of which they disapprove, would never think to

apply this method to limit other constitutional rights that they Iike.22
If, however, as the authors themselves believe, courts need not and often
should not follow original meaning, then courts are perfectly free to adopt a
robust individual-rights interpretation of the Second Amendment even if this
should contradict its original meaning. Uvilter and Merkel do not, of course,
consider this implication of rejecting originalism.
So far as I could tell, the authors present no new cvidence of the original
meaning of the Second Amendment and confine themselves to reliance on

20.

I learned for the first time that they are not originalists during their talks at the symposium

on their book held at the William & Mary School of Law. Until that moment, I had assumed from

the book that they were. I was perhaps misled by their statement near the beginning of the book
that: "Our historical approach is simply this: we take seriously the words chosen by the drafters, and
seek their meaning to the ratifying generation." Id. at 37. Perhaps like other readers, I took this to
describe their approach to constitutional interpretation.

21. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History o/the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L.

REv.

309, 369, 362-69 (1998) (arguing that "Madison's objecti ve in writing the Second

Amendment was not to grant an individual right but to set limits on congressional power"); Keith A.
Erhman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: HUIIe You Seen
Your Mii
l tio Lotely?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 24, 18-24 (1989) (concluding that Min the cOntellt of
the Constitution, the militia was viewed as a state-organized, state-run body" and that "(t]his
distinction between the militia as a state-organized body and as the entire citizenry at large is
important in understanding the Second Amendment because one of the central claim s of those who

oppose government effons to regulate firearms is that the 'militia' referred to in the Constitution
simply means an armed citizenry at large").

22. I know of no historian or law professor who, in ofe
f ring an originalist critique of the

individual rights position, has ever used an originalist method to limit the scope of any other right in
the Bill of Rights, though someone may have escaped my anenlion. Historian Jack Rakove, the
author of Original Meonings: Politics and Ideas in the Making oj the Comtitution (1997), for

ellample, has never claimed to be an originalist.

See, e.g., Jack

N. Rakove, Words, Deeds, ond
205, 206 (2002) (,,(lIt

Guns: ARMrNG AMERlCA and the Second Amendment, 59 WM. & MARY Q.

would be difficult to identify any clause of the Constitution more open to the common sense

objection that its modern interpretation should not be rooted in the concept of 'original intent' or
'original understanding,' simply because firearms are now far more devastating than anyone in the
,,
eighteenth century could have plausibly imagined. ).

The Right to Keep and Bear Anns

2004]

243

secondary sources or evidence already well-known to Second Amendment

scholars of all stripes. There is nothing wrong with offering a new interpre

tation of previously discussed evidence, of course, but readers should not
expect to find anything that has not been previously considered by other

writers in the field. Nothing new has been uncovered to change the debate.

And unfortunately for a book-length work, the authors do not treat compre

hensively all the available evidence of original meaning. This is particularly

regrettable as the quantity of such historical evidence is manageable enough
that all of it could have been evaluated in the space of a monograph.

Let me tum now from generalities to particulars, for it will come as no

surprise to those familiar with my writings in this area23 to learn that I am not
persuaded by the authors' originalist arguments and therefore disagree with

their conclusions. Because most of the book is taken up by a lengthy, and

largely uncontroversial, history of the militia before and after the adoption of

the Constitution, along with a discussion of classical republicanism, the

book's treatment of the Second Amendment is actually rather briee4 Their

conclusion that the individual right to anns is conditioned on service in an
organized militia rests on a few claims that I shall treat separately.
First

is the claim that "bear anns" had an

exclusively

military

connotation. Second, that, as a textual matter, the first part of the amendment
.2S
places a condition on the exercise of the right specified in the second part

Third, that the "Privileges or Immunities" of the Fourteenth Amendment do
not include the protection of an individual non-militia-based right to keep

and bear anns?6 Fourth, that the practical significance of finding the right to

bear anns to be an unconditional individual right is to protect an absolute

right to be free of any regulation whatsoever, no matter how reasonable.
Though this last claim hardly seems relevant to the authors' historical claims,

they repeat it in sometimes intemperate tones throughout the work.21 Finally,

the authors conclude that the general militia referenced in the Second

Amendment no longer exists?8 On all five counts, they err.
II.

Was "Bear Anns" Exclusively a Military Tenn?
The authors claim that

"Bearing anns implied making muster, equipped

and ready for service; keeping entailed steady readiness to serve when called
,
to duty: 29 For this proposition they reference with uncritical approval Garry

Wills's essay in

The New York Review ofBooks in stating that "bearing anns

23. E.g., Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kales, Under Fire: The New Consensus on the Second
Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996).
24. UVlLLER& MERKEL,supronole I. al 24-27.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Jd al 149-50.
Jd al 204-07.
/d. all,9,11, ]7, 54, 8],169,197.
Jd. al 109-44.
Jd. al ]9.
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had, from its earliest recorded employment and through the late eighteenth
,,
century, an exclusively military connotation. 30 From Wills the authors con
clude that "the verb 'to bear' ... would not have been used in the eighteenth

century-as it would not commonly be today-to connote purely private use

of arms.")[

It is not enough, however, to present numerous examples of the use of

"bear arms" in a military context to demonstrate that this is its exclusive use.
Claims of exclusivity are hard to establish empirically because it must be
shown that there are no other competing uses of a particular word. Just a few

counterexamples call such a claim into question and then force those making

it to do a systematic survey to distinguish normal from abnormal or deviant

uses. Individual-rights scholars have pointed to several instances of the term

"bear arms" being used in a nonmilitary context.32

A. Early Uses of "Bear Arms" Outside the Military Context
One important example, overlooked by the authors, is A Bill for the
Preservation ofDeer drafted by Thomas Jefferson and presented by James
Madison to the Virginia General Assembly in October of 1785.33 The bill
prohibited the taking of deer under certain circumstances and ends with the

following stricture:

[A]nd, if, within twelve months after the date of the recognizance he
shall bear a gun out of his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing
military duty, it shan be deemed a breach of the recognizance, and be
good cause to bind him a new, and every such bearing of a gun shall
be a breach of the new recognizance and cause to bind him again.4
1

Here "bear a gun

"

is clearly being used in a nonmilitary context, as it

exempts military bearing of a gun from the prohibition imposed on those

who previously violated the act.

(Note, however, that even offenders may

still "bear a gun" on their own property.)

Garry Wills dismisses this highly inconvenient bill with some too-fancy

footwork: "Not only is the context different from the amendment's, but the
,,
'bearing of a gun is not the canonical formulation with a plural noun. 35 As
'

to the first part of this sentence, Wills fails to note that the statute which he

claims uses the tenn in a different context, exempts military duty from the

30. [d. at 194 (citing Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REv. BOO KS, Sept. 21, 1995,
at 64 (hereinafter Wills, To Keep and Bear Anns] (emphasis added)). For respo�s to Wills by
Sanford Levinson, David C. Williams, Glenn Harlan Reynolds, and John K. Lattimer, and for
Wills's reply, see To Keep and Bear Arms: An Exchange, N.Y. REv. BooKS , Nov. 16, 1995, at6164,
31. [d. at 149.
32. See infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
33. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for the Preservation of Deer (Oct. 31, 1785), in 2 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 443, 444 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
34. [d. (emphasis added).
35. Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, supro note 30, at 64-65.
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scope of its prohibition, showing that it would otherwise be included in
"bearing a gun." In rejecting the relevance of this statute on the ground that
the context differs, he also assumes his

conclusion-that the Second

Amendment was exclusively military-a conclusion based in part on his

contention that "bear anus" is exclusively military. But the statute is offered

precisely to show that the term "bear arms" had a nonmilitary usage, in this
case that of hunting. So the statute undermines Wills's claim that the context

of the Second Amendment is indeed different, and his reassertion of the
"context" point to refute this inference is a non sequitur.

As for the second part, Wills is echoing a point made earlier in his

review that "[a]oe does not 'bear arm.' Latin arma is, etymologically, war
,
'equipment,' and it has no singular fonns. ,36 Wills has been misled by a spe

cies of language known to philosophers as a "mass noun."n Mass nouns like

"equipment" are useful when you need a tenn that will describe a class of
items without limiting yourself to particular types of the class.

Take the

word "luggage." You can say "pieces of luggage" or "suitcase" but there is

no singular of "luggage" (Le., you do not say, hand me that "Iugg"). A "right
to luggage" would not, grammatically, be a right that could only be exercised

collectively or en masse. Though ostensibly plural in fonn, the tenn "anns"

is functioning here as a mass noun. The Founders would not have wanted to
use the plural of "gun," for example, because the tenn "anns" also includes

edge weapons as well as weapons to be invented in the future. The fact that
there is no singular of "anns" tells us exactly nothing about its application.
Wills's argument might be dubbed a grammatical fallacy.38

Even though Jefferson's bill concerns only one type of anns (guns), it
,,39
refutes Wills's claim that "[o]ne does not bear arms against a rabbit.

However strange it may sound to his ears, it is undeniable that both Jefferson

and Madison did not think it odd to say that one does "bear a gun" to hunt
deer.4o So do others of their contemporaries, discussed below, whose state
ments to this effect are dismissed by Wills and by the authors because they

do not fit the authors' and Wills's opinion about the historical "context."

36. [d. at 64.

37. The New Oxford English Dictionary defines "mass noun"

as

"a noun denoting something

that cannot be counted (e.g., a substance or quality), in English usually a noun that lacks a plural i n
ordinary usage and is not used with the indefinite anicle, e.g., luggage, china, happiness.

Conb'aSted with COUNT NOUN."

NEW OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1051 (2001).

38. Another such gmmmatical fallacy is the claim that "commerce" in the Commerce Clause
had a narrow meaning excluding manufacturing because you would not speak of manufacturing
among the several states. But this awkwardness is caused by the meaning of "among the several
states" that limits the type of aclivities to those that could be conducted across state lines. Though it
is true that the original meaning of "commerce" did exclude manufacturing, this is established by
direct evidence of usage and the gnunmatical awkwardness of substituting "manufacturing" for
"commerce" in the Commerce Clause tells us nothing about its original meaning.

Original Meaning ofthe Commerce Clause, supra nOle 10, al I 12-13.
39. Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 30, al64.
40. See supra note 34 and accompanying texl.
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The authors (and Wills) fail to discuss the first learned treatise on the
Constitution authored by jurist and law professor St. George Tucker in his
annotated edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, published in 1803, and
u There, Tucker offers the

based on lectures that he gave in the 1790s:

following example of judicial review under the Necessary and Proper Clause:
If, for example, congress were to pass a law prohibiting any person
from bearing arms, as a means of preventing insurrections, the judicial
courts, under the construction of the words necessary and proper, here
contended for, would be able to pronounce decidedly upon the
constitutionality of these means. But if congress may use any means,
which they choose to adopt, the provision in the constitution which
secures to the people the right of bearing arms, is a mere nullity; and

any man imprisoned for bearing arms under such an act, might be
without relief; because in that case, no court could have any power to
pronounce on the necessity or propriety of the means adopted by
42

congress to carry any specified power into complete effect.

Tucker here is clearly discussing an individual right to keep and bear anns
outside of any militia context, and he ignores entirely the preface to the
Amendment.
Another important counterexample to their thesis that "bear aons" had
an exclusively military meaning, one that the authors do discuss, is the rec
ommendation

of

the minority

report

of

the

Pennsylvania

ratification

convention that the Constitution be amended to include the following:

defense ofthemselves
orfor the purpose ofkilling
game; and no law shall be passed for disanning the people or any of
them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury

That the people have a right to bear arms for the
and their own State, or the United States,

from individuals; and as standing armies in the time of

peace

are

dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military
shall be kept under strict subordination to and governed by the civil
43
power.
The authors readily concede that this proposal clearly uses "bear anns"
to include both nonmilitary ("defense of themselves," "for the purpose of
killing

game")

and

military

("and

their

own

State")

contexts,

thus

4 L The omission is curious as Tucker is discussed in articles cited and criticized by Uviller and
Merkel. They would have had to have skipped over this source in one article they discuss to reach
the quotation from the later treatise by Joseph Story, the treatment of which they chose to discuss at
some length. See UVlLLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 30-31 (discussing the scholarly treatment
of a Joseph Story passage by Barnett & Kates, supra note 23).
42. I ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
TI-lE CONSTlronON AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF TI-lE UNITED STATES AND OF
TI-lECOMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 289 (Augustus M. Kelley ed., 1969) (1803) (emphasis added).
43. Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Minority Proposal (Dec. 12, 1787) (emphasis added),
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 182 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
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the claim that "bear

undercutting

arms" had

an exclusively

military

connotation. But they repeatedly dismiss the minority report as reflecting
,
"marginal Yoices,' 44 a "disaffected minority,''"'s and "some radical,libertarian

support for an unrestricted right to weapons.,,46 They claim that the minority
report's "view of arms-related rights did not represent majority opinion in

Pennsylvania,''''1 adding heatedly that "the assertion of an individual right to

. beyond service in the lawful state militia may have reso
arms for purposes
nated with some groups of anarchic radicals, but that majority sentiment and

enlightened reason failed to embrace constitutional claims for such a right in

Pennsylvania.'>48 They even go so far as to claim that "[t]hese supporters of
[a] constitutional right to own weapons for private pwposes were atypical

even within the anti-federalist movement, and they remained insignificant
,
within the nation as a whole.' 4� One suspects from their vehement denuncia
tion

of

these

delegates

that

the

authors

think

this proposal

of

the

Pennsylvania minority hurts their case badly.
But, for all this sound and fury, it is remarkable that the authors offer
little, if any, evidence or secondary support for these claims about popular
opinion.5o

Perhaps they base these claims on the fact that this is a

recommendation made by a "minority" of delegates to the Pennsylvania

convention, but it is well known that several of the earlier constitutional con
ventions were packed by the comparatively well-organized Federalists. The

fact that this particular sentiment was held by a minority of delegates tells us
next to

nothing about whether it reflects the common view among

Pennsylvanians at large. Further, this individualist view of the right to keep

and bear anns could easily have reflected the view of the majority ·of dele
gates themselves who nevertheless supported ratifying the Constitution with

out amendments. Indeed, the strategy of ratification conventions proposing
amendments to Congress developed later in the ratification process.5]

44. UVlLlER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 82.
45.

rd. at 83.

46. Id.
41.

rd.

48. Id. at 85.
49. Id. at 81;

see also id. at 91 (referTing to "the radical fringe"); id. at 100 (refening to "a few
id. at 241 n.71 ("(TJhese endorsements almost invariably issue from

radicals outside Congress");

the pens of marginal, radical figures who did not represent the mainstream of either federal or

antifederal thought.").

(I) to a Fifth Circuit dedsion, Uniled
Emerson, that does not characterize as radical or minority the listed voices that bunrcss an

50. The only related footnote references in the book are

Slates

v.

individual right to bear anns and (2) to pages of an ankle by Saul Cornell that contain no claims

about majority versus minority sentiments. /d. at 241 n.71; see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d
203 (5th Cir. 2001); Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Slandard ModeJ. the Second
Amendment, and lhe ProbJem of HislOry in Contemporary ConslillilionaJ Theory, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 221, 231-34 (1999) (discussing the constitutional perspectives of the Pennsylvania
Antifederalists on the individual right to bear anns).
51. The Pennsylvania convention, the second to ratify the Constitution, did so on December 12,
1787. 2 DOCUMENTARY HtSTORY OF THE CONSnTIJTION OF THE UNtTED STATES OF AMERICA 21
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Evidence is required to establish the authors' dismissive claims, but none on
this point is offered.
When characterizing the Pennsylvania minority report as reflecting the
views of wild anarchic deviants, the authors fail to mention the wording of
the right-1o-arms provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776: "That
the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the
,,S2
state . . . ,
This right was reaffirmed in the 1790 Constitution in a passage
that reads: ''That the right of citizens to bear arms, in defence of themselves
n
In addition to using the same
and the state, shall not be questioned."
phraseology as the Pennsylvania minority, neither provision in these enacted
state constitutions even mentions the militia. So there is good reason to be
lieve that the Pennsylvania dissenters were merely elaborating the individual,
nonmilitia-conditioned right to bear arms already included in their state con
stitution.

In fairness then, the Pennsylvania dissenters can hardly be

"discount[ed] . . . as the rambling catch-all compendium of one man bent on
S4
scuttling ratification" without some evidence that this was so.
Nor was the Pennsylvania minority alone in attempting to amend the
Constitution to protect an individual right to arms not conditioned on militia
service. Included in the minority recommendation of the Massachusetts con
vention was this proposed amendment:
[The) Constitution be never construed . . . to prevent the people of the

United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own
arms; or to raise standing annies, unless when necessary for the
defence of the United States, or of some one or more of them; or to
prevent the people from petitioning, in a peaceable and orderly
manner, the federal legislature. for a redress of grievances; or to
subject the people to unreasonable searches and seizures of their
.
"
persons, papers or possessions.

(1894). The first state convention to append proposed amendments was Massachusetts--tbe sixth
state to ratify-which voted for ratification on February 6, 1788. Jd. at 93-96. After
Massachusetts, all of the remaining seven states except Maryland proposed amendments to the
Constitution along with theif vote to ratify. Jd at 97. These proposals can also be accessed online
from the Avalon Project at Yale Law School, at http://www.yale.edullawwebiavalon/18th.htm
(click on "Ralification ofthe Consritution" fOf an individual stale) (last visited Oct. 17, 2(04).
52. PA. CONST. of 1176, ch. I, art. XIII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 43, at 184. The Vennont Consritution of 1177 contains identical language. VT. CaNST. of
1777, ch. J, art. XV, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43, 81 184.
53. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 21 (emphasis added), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 184.
54. UV1LLER& MERKEL,supra note I, at 270 n.9O.
55. Massachusens Ratification Convention Minority Proposal (Feb. 6, 1788) (emphasis added),
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 181. This recommendation is in
contrast with the Massachusetts state consritution thaI protecled only the right to beaT anns "for the
common defence." MASS. CaNST. of 1780, pI. I, art. XVII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 183.
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As in Pennsylvania, this proposal does not explicitly mention the militia.
The right to keep arms appears among a list of purely individual rights, none
of which are in any way conditioned upon service in the militia.
In addition, the New Hampshire ratification convention officially
proposed that the Constitution be amended to read that "Congress shall never
i n unless such
disann any Citze

as

are or have been in Actual Rebellion."S6

Uviller and Merkel grudgingly concede that this proposal

"might support the

S7 It should also
argument that a private right to gun possession is protected."

be noted that none of the other right·to-anns proposals made by New York,
North Carolina, Virginia, or Rhode Island were expressly limited to "the
,
common defence" or "the defence of the state, ,58 though, as the authors note,
the Massachusetts Bill of Rights was qualified in this way.S9
Uviller and Merkel should be estopped from responding that the
language in the Pennsylvania and Vermont constitutions does not reflect an
individual right exercisable both within and outside of militia service, for
their interpretation of these passages is inconsistent with such an argument.60
When discussing the later Kentucky case of

Bliss

\/.

Commonwealth, in

which the court interprets the very same language in the Kentucky
Constitution as protecting an individual right,61 the authors readily concede
that it does indeed have this broader meaning.62

They respond by

distinguishing the language on the ground that this wording differs from that
of the Second Amendment.63

By striking down a law banning concealed

weapons, they note that "the [Kentucky] Court of Appeals acknowledged a

56. New Hampshire Ratification Convention Repon (JWle 2 1 1788) (emphasis added),
reprinted in THE COMPLETE Bill OF RiGHTS, supra note 43, at 181. The authors claim, again
,

without evidence, that this proposal "sought to push the republic further than any of the olher states

supra note I, at 82.
57. UVlllER & MERKEL, supra note I, al 82 (emphasis added). Even a single eumple of a

desired to go." UVlllER & MERKEL,

patently individual right to bear arms rebuts a charge commonly made by collective-right
proponents, and now by miliria-condirioned.individual-right proponents, that the unconditioned·
n
i dividual-rights fonnulation is a pure invention of

modem guo rights scholars with

no

basis in

history.

58. New York Proposal (July 26, 1788), reprinted in ThE COMPLETE Bill OF RIGHTS, supra
I, 1788), reprinted in ThE COMPLETE Bill OF
RiGHTS, supra nOle 43, at 182; Virginia Proposal (Jun. 27, 1788), reprinfed in THE COMPLETE Bill
OF RtGHTS, supra nole 43, al 182-83; Rhode Island Proposal (May 20, 1790), reprinted in THE
COMPLETE BilL OF RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 182.
59. UVlLlER & MERKEl, supra note I, at 82.
60. Others not 50 constrained mly conlend that "the defence of themselves" was still a
note 43, al 181-82; North Carolina Proposal (Aug.

collective notion referring 10 "the community," and such defense was to be done entirely withm the
context of the militia. I address this claim-which is not made by Uviller and Merkel-in subpart

11(0). See infro notes 115-39139 and accompanying lext
6 1 . 1 2 Ky. (2 Lin.)90,90(1822).
62. UVIUElt &: MERKEL, supra note I, at 27-28.
6). Id. at 28.
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private, state constitutional right for purposes having nothing to do with
,
militia service, >64
The authors also dismiss the 1846 Georgia case of Nunn

v.

State, in

which the state judge found a law banning certain pistols to be unconstitu
tional under both the Georgia constitution and the Second Amendment.6S
Here the authors criticize the judge for not considering himself sufficiently
bound by the "revered" John Marshall's earlier opinion in Barron v.
Baltimore in which the Court held that the Bill of Rights applied only to the

federal govemment.66

"[FJor those who seek a coherent doctrine," they
,,

Georgia [sic] is a case of no importance whatever. 67 But
coherent doctrine is not why we look to Nunn. Rather Nunn is significant
write,

"Nunn

v.

because it is inconsistent with the claim that the right to keep and bear anns
existed only in the context of militia service.
Moreover, in their dismissal of

Nunn, Uviller and Merkel fail to

appreciate that many people then viewed the Bill of Rights, at least in part, as
declaratory of preexisting rights and therefore as good authority to anyone,
including a state court, trying to ascertain what the fundamental rights of per
sons might be.68 Strictly speaking,

Barron merely deprives the rights speci

fied in the Bill of Rights of federal protection as against state governments.
The Court does not hold that these rights are inapplicable to the states, should
state courts decide to apply them. However this issue is decided, the opinion
in Nunn still stands as an example of the right to bear anns being interpreted
as an individual right outside Ihe military context.
Surprisingly, nowhere in their book do the authors discuss how the right
to keep and bear anns related to the natural right of self defense, though the
wording of the Pennsylvania Constitution and other statements invokes a
right of "defence.'.69 Instead, the authors claim that the right to anns "did nOI
readily lend ilself to Locke's rational and enlightened discourse about the
,,
nature of man and the entitlements appurtenant thereto. 7o Scholarly litera
ture is replete with observation that the righl to keep and bear anns was

64. fd The authors men gratuitously observe that subsequent Kentucky constitutions expressly
"allowed me legislarure to pass gun control laws." lei. This further modification of me text,
however, supports the view mal die unmodified language protected an individual-right-free-of
militia connotation.
65. I Ga. 243 (1846). Tbe authors cite this case as Nunn II. Georgia. UVILLER & MERKEL,
supra note I , al 30.
66. 32 U.S. 243, 247-5 1 (1833); UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 29-30.
67. UVILLER& MERKEL, supra note I, at 30.
68. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 147-56
(1998) (descrihing "the declaratory theory" of the Bill ofRights).
69. See, e.g., PA. CONST. of 1790, art. lX, § 21, reprimed in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS,
slipra note 43, at I84.
70. UVILLER& MERKEL, supra notc I , at 164.
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viewed as an extension of the fundamental right of self defense,?' but the
authors cursorily dismiss this notion in their book.n
The authors attempt to mitigate Nunn v. State by discussing the 1840
Tennessee case of Aymette v. Slate. 73 In Aymette, the court upheld a ban on
the wearing of a concealed bowie-knife, reasoning that "[t]hese weapons
would be useless in war. They could not be employed advantageously in the
common defence of the citizens. The right to keep and bear them is not,
,,
therefore, secured by the constitution. 74 Uviller and Merkel claim that the
state constitutional provision in �uestion was "similar in form and words to
the federal Second Amendment." S But unlike the Second Amendment (and
the other proposed amendments and state right·to-anns provisions discussed
above), the Tennessee constitutional provision �ualified the right to bear
arms by the phrase "for their common defence,"? and the court places great
stress on this language in the passage quoted by Uviller and Merkel. 77 As the
authors acknowledge elsewhere,'s this language suggests a more military or
mutual defense meaning.
In contrast to the language of the Tennessee constitution, however, the
U.S. Senate rejected a proposal to add the qualifier "for the common
defence" to the language of the Second Amendment.79 While the authors
dismiss the significance of the Senate's refusal on the ground that this quali
fying language was redundant,SO their assertion requires independent proof
that the unqualified right is already limited to uses of arms for the common
defense and does not also include the use of arms by the people in defense of
themselves, as several state constitutions specified. In other words, only if
you assume that you have established the meaning of the right to keep and
7 1 . See generally Anthony J. Dennis, Clearing Ihe Smokefrom Ihe RighI to Bear Arms and the
Second Amendmen/, 29 AKRON l. REv. 57 (1995); David B. Kopel, The Self-Defense Cases, 27 AM.
J. CR1M. l. 293 (2000).

72. UViLLER& MERKEL, supra note I , at 166-67.

73. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 152 (1840).

74. ld. at 156.

The authors

arc

wrong to claim that individual rights scholars are guilty of

"Ii)gnoring the case from Tennessec." UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 27. It is widely
discussed in the Second Amendment literature. E.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN

BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSnnmONAL RiGIff 94 (1984). By contrast, Halbrook notes

an earlier 1833 case, overlooked by the authors, in which the Tennessee court offered a broader
meaning of the right-ta-arms provision in Tennessee's constitution: "By this clause of the
constitution, an express power is given and secured to all the free citizens of the State to keep and

bear arms for their defense, wi/haul any qualification whatever 0$ 10 Iheir kind or nature." Simpson
v. State, 13 Tenn. (5 Yer.) 356, 360 (\833) (emphasis added), quoted in HALBROOK, supra, a1 94.
75. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 27.

76. TENN. CONST. of 1836, art.

I, § 26, quoled in AymeUe v. State, 21

Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158

(1840).
77. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note
78.

I, at 27.

ld. at 104.

79. [d. at 103.
80. [d. at 104 (arguing that "invocation of arms bearing in the militia already clearly proclaimed

the pUlJIOse of common defense to eighteenth-century cars"). But the Second Amendment does not
refer to "anns bearing in the militia."
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bear arms can you contend that this additional language was superfluous.
Equally if not more plausible is the inference that the qualifying language
might well have been rejected because it unduly narrowed the scope of the
right. In the absence of any recorded debate, we just do not know.

B. Evidence That the Right "to Keep " Arms is Not Military
To determine original meaning, as opposed to original intent, the cryptic
and unreported Senate deliberations are far less important than the existence
of state constitutional right-la-arms guarantees that included the broader
"defence of themselves" language. A member of the public in 1791 reading
the Second Amendment would likely not assume that the unqualified right in
the Amendment actually meant something narrower than the broad right to
anns for both personal and collective self defense that was already protected
by some state constitutions.
Take, for example, the reaction to Madison's proposed amendments by
Samuel Nasson, an Antifederalist representative to the Massachusetts ratifi
cation convention held the previous year. In a letter to George Thatcher, a
Federalist congressman from Massachusetts, Nasson wrote:
I find that Ammendments [sic] are once again on the Carpet. I hope
that such may take place as will be for the Best Interest of the whole.
A Bill of rights well secured that we the people may know how far we
may Proceade in Every Department then their will be no Dispute
Between the people and rulers in that may be secured the right to keep
anns for Common and Extraordinary Occations such as to secure
ourselves against the wild Beast and also to amuse us byfowling and
for our Defence against a Conunon Enemy . . . .Sl
Nasson then goes on to extol the virtue of popular resistance to a "foreign
foe" and condemn standing annies in times of peace.82 Notwithstanding his
concern for the common defense, Nasson nevertheless reads the right to keep
arms in the Second Amendment as also a personal one, unconnected with
militia service.83 Note also, that Nasson uses "arms" for hunting, in contrast
with Garry Wills's assertions.84
This quote goes unmentioned by Uviller and Merkel, though it appears
in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United Slates v. Emerson,ss an opinion that
they much discuss and disparage.86 Instead of letting readers make up their
own minds about such contemporary statements, this highly inconvenient
81. Letter from Samuel Nasson to George Thatcher (July 9, 1789), in CREATING THE BILL OF

RIGHTS: THE DOCuMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 260-61 (Helen E.

Veit et a1. cds., 1991) (emphasis added).
82. Jd.
83. Jd.

84 . Wills, To Keep and Beor Arms, supro note 30, at 64.

85. 270 F.3d 203, 253 (5th Cir. 200\).
86. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note \, at 220-24.
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direct evidence of original meaning is dismissed by the authors in a single
conc)usory sentence: "Contrary to many commentators and to our own inter

pretation, the court finds 'numerous instances' where the words were em
ployed to connote private carrying for private purposes.

Accordi

�ly. they

conclude that the term refers to carrying or wearing arms generally.

7

An earlier letter from Massachusetts historian and pastor Jeremy

Belknap to Federalist Paine Wingate, written in May

1789, evidences that

NassaD was not alone in this individualist reading of the right to arms.ss

Belknap writes of his pleasure with Samuel Adams's investiture speech as
lieutenant governor in which Adams affirmed that:

"[T]he people may enjoy well grounded confidence that their personal

& domestic rights are secure." This is the same Language or nearly
the same which he used in the (Massachusetts ratification] Convention

when he moved for an addition to the proposed Amendments-by
inserting a clause to provide for the Liberty of the press-the right to

keep arms-Protection from seizure of person & property & the

Rights of Conscience.89

As it turned out, none of these "personal and domestic" rights were

included

among

the

amendments

proposed

by

the

Massachusetts

convention.90 Would anyone, however, fairly conclude from this omission

that the liberty of the press or the right of conscience was supported only by a
minority or radical fringe of the population of Massachusetts?

More

importantly, these two contemporary letters join the ranks of other direct

statements about the public meaning of the Second Amendment and the right

to keep and bear anns, indicating that the Second Amendment right protected
a personal, individual right like the other rights in the Bill of Rights.

These statements by Nasson and Belknap, along with the previously

quoted proposal from the Massachusens minority, highlight a single fact
overlooked by the authors and by others who now base their historical argu

ment on the supposedly military meaning of " bear anns"; The Second

Amendment also protects the right to

keep anns. No evidence is presented

by the authors to show that "keep" was a military tenn at all, much less ex
clusively SO.91
anns"

These references to a personal, individual right "to keep

are significant, therefore, because even if "bear anns" did have an ex

clusively military connotation. the individual and nonmilitary right to "keep"
anns

still colors the meaning of the Second Amendment as a whole, giving it

a nonmilitary meaning as well.

87. [d. at 222.

88. Letter from Jeremy Belknap 10 Paine Wingate (May 29, 1789), in CREATING THE BtLL Of

RIGHTS, supra nOle 81, at 241, 241.

89. Id. (quoting Samuel Adams's investituK speech as lieutenant governor).

90. Amendments Proposed by the Massachusetts Convention (Feb. 6, 1788),
B[LLOr RlGHTS, supra note 81, at [4, 14-15.

9 1 . !k� UVlllER &: MERKEL, supru note I, at 149.
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Perhaps because the Second Amendment literature had not previously
discussed the Nasson and Belknap statements, Wills fails to consider them in
,92
The best counterexample that
his exposition on the meaning of "to keep.,
he can produce is a statement in which John Trenchard "advised that 'a
competent number of them [firelocks] be kept in every parish for the young
,93
men to exercise with on holidays. "
That "kept" can be used in a military
context, however, does not give the word itself a military connotation.
"Truck" can be used in a military context too, but that does not make the
word itself military, much less exclusively military. That arms can be "kept"
in an armory, as of course they can, does not mean that they cannot also be
"kept" at home.94
Wills concludes: "To separate one tenn from this context and treat it as
specifying a different right (of home possession) is to impart into the lan
guage something foreign to each tenn in itself, to the conjunction of tenns,
,
and to the entire context of Madison's sentence. ,95 But given his lack of
evidence, Wills's argument concerning "to keep" must really boil down to
his tenuous claim that "bear anns" is exclusively military and therefore "to
keep" must be military when conjoined with it. With Nasson, Belknap, and
the authors of the Massachusetts minority report, however, we have actual
members ofthe public at the founding referencing the right to keep arms and
describing it as a nonmilitary right. Appeals to "context" cannot silence

92. It is typical in this debate for the individual-rights scholars to produce direct evidence of
usage, which their opponents then attempt to shoot down, usually by assening some larger
"context," rather than producing new direct evidence of their own.
93. Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 30, at 67 (quoting JOHN TRENCHARD, AN
ARGUMENT, SHEWING, ntAT A STANDING ARMY Is INCONStSTENT WITH A FREE GOVERNMENT
AND ABSOLUTELY DESTRUCTIVE TO THE CONSTITlJTTON OF THE ENGLISH MONARCHY 21 (1691))
(alteration in Wills's article) (emphasis added by Wills). Wills also offers a quote from Federalist
15 in which Alexander Hamilton records that "the objection to standing annies was to 'keeping
them up in a season of tranquility.'" {d. at 67 n.30 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 160
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 00., 1961» . Wills notes that "Ials an English noun, 'keep'
meant the pennanently holdable pan of a castle . . ." Id. at 67 n.34. Fair-minded readers can
decide for themselves if Wills is being sensitive here to "context," and whether these uses of "keep"
in any way detract from the significance of the use of "kcep anns" by Nasson and Belknap. Or
might Wills himself be guilly of the same foible that he accuses individual-rights scholars of
manifesting-"seeking out every odd, loose, or idiosyncratic" use of II tenn "in defiance ofthe solid
body ofcentral reference," id. at 64, or of what he dubs thc "throw-in-the-Idtchen-sink approach?"
Jd. at 65.
94. It is perhaps useful to remember that, in 1995, Wills was writing before gun rights
opponents had made the transition from the "collective right"-of-states n
i terpretation of the Second
Amendment to the new militia-conditioned-individual-right theory. Hence, he still is claiming that
the original meaning of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights was to protect the rights of
states to have a militia-the view now rejected by writers such as Uviller and Merkel. UV[LLER &
MERKEL, supra note I, at 12. Additional evidence is needed to fully refute this claim. For a
summary, see United States v. Emer$on, 270 F.3d 203, 236-60 (5th Cir. 2001). Wills's work s
i
wonh mentioning, however, because writers like Uviller and Merkel still rely heavily on his New
York Review ofBooks essay claiming that "bear arms" was an exclusively military term. UV[LLER
&MERKEL, supra note I, at 27, 1Q4-{l5, 194, 296-97.
95. Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, supra note 30, at 68.
.
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these contemporary statements. If anything, conjoining the right to bear arms
with the nonmilitary right to keep arms renders them both nonmilitary in Ihis
context, but there is no reason to insist on so narrow a definition.
These statements-like others relied upon by individual-rights scholars
that I do not reiterate here96---are direct evidence of what the public thought
the Second Amendment phrase "the right to keep and bear anns" meant.
Unlike the authorities relied upon by Uviller and Merkel (or Wills), they are
not statements merely evincing a concern for the militia, from which we are
supposed to circumstantially infer what the "right to keep and bear arms"
might have meant. These statements evidence what the specific words of the
Second Amendment objectively manifested to real people. The dirty little
secret of this long-running debate is that only one side has produced any con
crete examples of actual statements from the founding era expressing that
side's interpretation of the right to keep and bear arms and the Second
Amendment.
C. Evidence That to "Bear Arms " Meant to Carry Anns

Several times the authors assert, once again without evidence, that the
term "bear arms" was chosen because it did not connote the mere carrying of
guns. "In late-eighteenth-century parlance, bearing arms was a term of art
with an obvious military and legal connotation. 'Carrying a gun' lacks the
implication of bearing anns and, of course, the Constitution nowhere men
,,
tions a 'right to carry a gun., 97 The 1785 edition of Samuel Johnson's A
,
Dictionary of the English Language repeatedly defines "bear" as "carry. ,98
After describing "bear" as a "word used with such latitude, that it is not eas
ily explained," the dictionary lists its first meaning as "To carry as a burden,"
followed immediately by "To convey or carry," "To carry as a mark of
authority," "To carry as a mark of distinction," "To carry as in show," "To

96. For a useful compendium of examples, see Emerson, 270 F.3d at 236-59. Those who
oppose the individual-rights interprelation love to deride the reiteration of the same examples, as
though examples of usage wear out from overuse. See. e.g., Wills, To Keep ond Bear Arms, supra
note 30, at 65 (noting that "Slandilrd Modelers" refer "again and again" to the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention's minority VOle to place killing game among the objects of a right to bear
arms).
In contraSt, they offer no examples of founding-era views regarding Ihe Second
Amendment, or the right 10 keep and bear anns, that conespond to the view that they claim
everyone held. E.g., UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, al 109 ("To the ratifiers, the right to keep
and bear arms was inextricably and exclusively bound to the maintenance of a militia . . . .").
Instead, they use "context" to explain away and trump the contrary evidence. When it comes to
historical evidence, however, you cannol beal something with nothing.
97. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 26-27; see also id. at 149 ("The righl to anTIS is
declared by the verbs, 'keep and bear,' a phrase carefully selected in preference to alternatives such
as 'have,' 'own,' 'carry,' or 'possess."1. The authors offer no independenl evidence as to the
"care" thai went into this verbal choice. See id. The argument that the phrase "keep and bear" must
have been carefully chosen instead ofthese other words that connote a different meaning assumes a
fact that must be shown: that these other words would indeed have connoted a different meaning.
98. I SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (nol paginated) (photo.
reprinl 1990) ( 1755).
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,
carry as in trust," and «To carry in the mind, as love, hate., 99

So "carry"

seems to be the most prevalent synonym of "bear," The same is true for the

first edition of Webster's dictionary, which defined "bear" as "[1]0 carry" and
which mentions "to carry" nine times in discussing the term's derivation
from other languages,lOO So far as Johnson and Webster are concerned, "to
hear" simply means to carry.
This usage is borne out in the context of the Second Amendment by the
Supreme Cowt's earliest known reference to the right to anns. This refer
ence goes unmentioned by the authors (and Wills), though Uviller and
Merkel purport to comprehensively discuss the few times that the Supreme
Court has discussed the Second Amendment, including even a television in
terview with Chief Justice Warren Burger.lOl

In his infamous opinion in

Dred Scott v. Sandford, Chief Justice Taney denies that blacks could have
been considered citizens of the United States for, if that were the case, then
blacks would enjoy along with whites "the full liberty of speech . . . and to
,,
keep and carry anns wherever they went. 102
In this passage, Justice Taney uses "carry" as a substitute or synonym
for "bear" and implies that the right protected by the Second Amendment is
to carry weapons wherever one travels, a right completely unconnected with
active militia service.lOl Taney groups the right to keep and bear arms in the
Second Amendment with the equally nonmilitary liberty of speech protected
by the First Amendment.104 And he obviously thinks that his readers would
share his interpretation of the Second Amendment, or his

reductio ad

absurdum for black citizenship would fail.
The authors cannot have omitted Taney's opinion because of its late
date or racist reasoning and outcome because they rely on the nearly-as-vile
ruling in

Uniled Slales

v.

Cruikshank, an even later opinion in which the

Supreme Court frees some members of the Ku Klux Klan who were

convicted of violating the civil rights of blacks in Louisiana by torturing and
murdering them. 105 According to the reasoning of the Court in

Cruikshank,

cited approvingly by the authors,l06 the defendants could not have been guilty
of violating the victims' rights under color of state law because the entire Bill

99. ld
100. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1st ed. 1828)
(not paginated) (listing "To cany" as the second definition out of twenty; the first definition-"To
suppan; to sustain"-is less relevant n
i the context ofanns).
tot. UVfLLER& MERKEL, .fUpra note I, at 13.
102. 60 U.S. 393, 417 (1856).
103. See /d.
104. See M.
105. 92 U.S. 542, 559 (1875).
106. UVILLER & M£RKEL, .fupra note I, at 14.
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of Rights, including the rights of assembly and to keep and bear arms, applies
only to federal, and not state, exercises of power.I07
Although today we protect such liberties (a historically and
incompletely) by "incorporating" them into the Due Process Clause, the
protection of the right to arms against infringement by the states, as I discuss
below in Part IV, is more properly included within the original meaning of
08
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
Clearly. however. if the later doctrine of incorporation properly applies to the
right of assembly, it can just as easily apply to the right to anns, Crnikshank
notwithstanding.
Some might object to the relevance of all the nineteenth-century cases
that I have discussed for establishing original meaning of an amendment en
acted in 1791, and 1 sympathize with the objection. The fanher in time that
one gets from promulgation, the less germane is the evidence of public
meaning. 1 offer these cases because nineteenth-century cases are discussed
at length by the authors in their opening chapterlO9 and because they concede
that these cases interpreting the language "in defence of themselves and the
state" represent the antithesis of their view.llo This in tum is relevant to the
meaning of the same language used at the founding in right-to-arms provi
sions in the state constitutions discussed above. I I I
Also, more recent cases are useful to establish the late development of a
collective or states-rights view of the amendment-a view unknown at the
founding and correctly rejected by the authors.11 2 Finally, Taney's opinion in
Dred Scott refutes the authors' suggestion that the Supreme Court has never
considered the Second Amendment to protect an individual right uncondi
II)
In this, its earliest known mention of the
tioned on militia service.
Amendment, the Court clearly did.
D.

Was "defence ofthemselves " Also Exclusively Military?

Before moving on to the next problem with Uviller and Merkel's
originalist argument, let me briefly consider a different militia-conditioned
interpretation of "for the defence of themselves and the state" that they do
not offer. As we just saw, Uviller and Merkel concede that the wording of
the Pennsylvania minority report included a personal right to bear arms

107.

Croikshank, 92 U.S. at 552. The authors do not infoon the reader that the Croikshank
right of assembly also does not apply 10 the states via Ihe Fourteenth
Amendment. UVILLER & MERKEL. supra nOle I , at 14.
108. See infra notes 160-73 and accompanying tex\.
109. UVILLER & MERKEL. supra note I, at 9-36.
court fOWld thaI the

IlO. ld at 12-13.

I l l . Setsupra notes 52, 61-64, 76, and accompanying text.
112.

UVIUER& MERKEL, supra note 1, al 179.

113. ld. al 13.
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outside the militia context. 1 14 That is why they go to such lengths to
marginalize these speakers. Olhers, however, might claim that the phrase
"for the defence of themselves" was the equivalent of "for the defence oflhe
community," a right that also was to be exercised solely in the context oflhe
militia.
Here is a brieflist oflhe problems with that claim:
(I) First, and most importantly, r am aware of no direct evidence of
anyone at the time of the founding asserting that "in defence of themselves"
means "for the defence oflhe community."
(2) As a textual matter. "in defence of themselves" seems most
obviously to be simply the plural of the personal right of self defense, a usage
that was appropriate given that the subject of the right is the plural tenn "the
people." In other words, if the drafters wanted to use the tenn "the people"
as they had in other amendments, and "the people" is the plural of individual
person, how else would the right to bear anns for personal self defense be
protected besides making the second tenn "themselves"? A drafter would
not write "himselves" or "him or herselves."
(3) Indeed, this same grammatical choice is made in the Fourth
Amendment, which refers to the "right of the people to be secure in their
S
persons, houses, papers, and effects . . " .' , II SO here "the people" is being
used as the plural of individual person, as reflected in the use of the word
"their"-just like the use of "themselves" in state constitutions. Similarly,
the English Bill of Rights refers to the ri�ht of individual protestant
"Subjects" to "have AnTIs for their Defence." 16 There is no difference in
meaning between "their defence" and "in defence of themselves."
(4) It is true that the founders used "no rerson" and "any person" in
the Fifth Amendment to refer to individuals, 1 7 but this is a grammatical
consequence of shifting from affinning that everyone has a particular right to
a claim about particular individuals not being denied a right. In the absence
of direct and compelling historical evidence to the contrary, nothing in the
public meaning would tum on this grammatical flip between the Fourth
Amendment, on the one hand, and the First, Second, and Fifth Amendments
on the other.
(5) Consider this language from the very same 1776 Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights in which the "in defence of themselves" language
appears:

1 14. Seediscussion supra subpan II(A).
1 1 5 . U,S.

CaNsT.

amend.

IV

(emphasis added).

To forestall future debate on this point,

"persons" in this passage refers to their bodies as distinct from their possessions.

1 1 6. Bill of Rights, 1688, I W. & M. ch. 2, § 1 (Eng.) (emphasis added); see JOYCE LEE
MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGIN OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 1 1 9 (1994)
(describing the legislative history of this formulation, which lacked any mililia preface or
condition).
1 1 7. U.S. CONST. amend.

V.
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[Tlhe people have a right to hold

themselves, their houses. papers, and

possessions free from search or seizure; and therefore warrants
without oaths or afftmlations first made, affording a sufficient
foundation for them, and whereby any officer or messenger may be
commanded or required to search suspected places, or to seize

any

person or persons, his or their property, nol particularly described, are
8
contrary to thaI right, and ought not to be granted. I 1
Did the use of the tenn "themselves" imply that the reference here is to "the
community" rather than to individual rights? Hardly. The last portion of this
statute refutes any such suggestion. Nearly identical language appears in the
1777 Vermont Constitution.1 I 9 Other state constitutional protections from
unreasonable searches refer to "every subject" with no apparent difference in
meaning.120

Or

consider

this passage

from

the

1780

Massachusetts

Constitution: "that the judges of the supreme judicial court should hold their
offices as long as they behave

themselves

well; and that they should have

honorable salaries ascertained and established by standing laws." 121

(6)

As I have already discussed, language expressing "in defence of

the community" was readily available and in use in, for example, the
Massachusetts Constitution, which referred to "a right to keep and bear arms
for the common defense"l22--qualifying language that was proposed and
rejected in the Senate as an amendment to the Second Amendment.123

(7)

Finally, this interpretation of "in defence of themselves" leads to a

bizarre interpretation of the Pennsylvania minority report itself that Uviller
and Merkel, and others, claim to be a pure (and radical, exceptional, and
rejected) statement of individual rights.

By this interpretation, even the

Pennsylvania dissenters did not seek to protect an individual right of self
defense!

We would be asked to believe that they sought instead to protect

the right to defend the community ("in defence of themselves"), the right to
defend the state ("and their own state"-notice the use of the word "their,"
by the way, as in the Fourth Amendment), and the right to kill game, but not
the right to anns for personal self defense.

118. PA. CaNST. of 1776, ch. I,

art.

This interpretation would not

X (emphasis added), reprinled in THE COMPLETE Bill OF

RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 235.

119. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. I I ("That the People have a Right to hold themselves, their

Houses, Papers and Possessions free from Search or Seizure . . . .) (emphasis added), reprinted in
THE COMPlETE Bill OF RIGHTS, supra note

43, at 235.
120. E.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XIII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RlOHTS,
supra ROle 43, at 234; N.H. CONST. of 1783, art. XXII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE Bill OF
RlGHTS, supra nOIe 43, at 234.
121. MASS. CaNST. of 1780, art. XXIX (emphasis added), reprinted in THE COMPLETE Bill OF
RlOHTS, supra note 43, at 234.
122. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
123. UV[llER & MERKEl, supra Rote I, at 103; see alsa supra notes 79-80 and accompanying
text.
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only be bizarre, it would contradict Uviller and Merkel's repeated aspersion
that the Pennsylvania dissenters were weird radicals and anarchists because
they asserted an individual right to keep and bear anns.1 24

E.

Evidence a/Congressional Usage
By the end of the book, the authors gel a little carried away and assert

that "[t]o the ratifiers, bearing arms unequivocally meant rendering military

service."l2S As we have seen, the examples that they discuss and others that
they omit include numerous uses of the tenT) "bear" outside the military
context.

With one exception, no quantitative evidence is presented here to

show that these uses were aberrant. 1 26 The exception is found in a footnote,

quoting an article by David Yassky in which he reports "searching a Library
of Congress database containing all official records of debates in the
Continental and U.S. Congresses between

1774 and 1821" and finding that
,,
"the phrase had an unambiguously military meaning. 127 Yassky's quantita
tive survey is highly relevant to the issue of whether the original public

meaning of "bear arms"

included a military connotation. It establishes this

uncontroverted claim beyond any doubt. But as proof that the term had an

exclusively military connotation-a much harder claim to establish-it is far
from dispositive. The problem is to establish the relevant baseline in the da

tabase that Yassky used.
My own search of this database generally confinns that the discussions
in which "bear arms" appears (not including references to the Second

Amendment) in the period searched by Professor Yassky do indeed concern
only military matters.128

But this cannot establish, as Yassky asserts, that
,,
during this period "the phrase [had] an unambiguously military meaning. 1 29

124. ld at 83.

125. Id at 194.

126. By quantitative, I mean a systematic survey of a database from which conclusions about

nonnal and aberrational usage can be drawn. This is not to diminisb the type of evidence on which
the authors rely.

Often, such statements are all that is available and I have relied upon such

evidence myself. See supra note 10 (referring to my reliance

on

statements of various panicipants

in the historical period to detennine the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause).

In the

absence of quantitative evidence, however, assenions that a panicular view was "insignificant" or
"mdical" OT a "minority" view-much less "the rambling catch-all compendium of one man bent on

scunling Tatification"-are difficult to establish. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 81-83, 270

n.9O. With respect to the right to keep and bear arms, the situation is worse, as many examples of
contemporaries who viewed the right as personal and individual have been produced, while we have

no example of a single person who stated that the Second Amendment meant what Uviller and
Merkel claim that everyone but a few radicals thought it meant.
127. David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and ConslilUlionaf Change, 99

MICH. L. REV. 588, 618 (2000), quoted in UViLLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at296 n.7.

128. I used the same database as did Yassky, although the years covered by the database seem

to have expanded since his search.

A Century ofLawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional

Documents and Debates, 1774-1875, 01 hltp:l/memory.loc.gov/ammemlamJawllawhome.html (last
visited Nov. 2003).
129. Yassky, supranole 127, a1618.
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Why not? Because if only military matters were under discussion when arms
were mentioned in Congress during this period, then it follows from this
fact-and not from any exclusive meaning of the phrase "bear arms"-that
all uses of the phrase "bear anns" during this period in this database would
necessarily be military.
To test this proposition, I searched for phrases that Uviller and Merkel
might concede have nonmilitary connotations, like "carry arms," "possess
anns," and "have arms" and found just one nonmilitary result.110
Significantly, I also found no references at all in this database to "keep
arms," other than one (garbled) reference to the Second Amendment.lli This
finding further suggests both (I) that the discussions involving "anns" in this
database during this period were exclusively about military matters, such that
we would expect "bear anns" to be used only in its military sense, and (2)
that "keep anns" did not have a commonly employed military connotation. m
Professor Yassky's findings should not be surprising. Given the nar
rowly interpreted powers of Congress during the era that he surveyed, 17741821, it is hardly unexpected that congressional debates would be discussing
arms only in a military context. Congress had neither the inclination nor the
power to propose laws that would have affected the personal right to keep or
bear arms outside the militia context. Besides, it was constitutionally barred
from doing so by the Second Amendment.
Furthermore, since Professor Yassky did his search, the Library of
Congress extended its database to the year 1875, covering the tumultuous
years before, during, and after the Civil War, when the personal, nonmilitary
rights of blacks and others to keep and bear arms were perceived as threat
ened from a variety of sources. Sure enough, four examples of the word
"bear arms" from this era appear to refer to a personal right outside the con
text of the militia.133 Each of the following examples substantiates the
proposition that, when Congress was discussing nonmilitary matters that

130. "Is it possible, he asked, that an anny could be raised for the purpose of enslaving
themselves and their brethren? or, if raised, whether they could subdue a nation of freemen, who
know how to prize liberty, and who have arms in their hands?" 2 lQNATIiAN ELUOT, THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL

STATE CONVENTIONS ON

THE ADOPT10N Of

TIfE

FEDERAL

IN

1787, al
97 (2d ed. 1836) (statement of Theodore Sedgwick to the Massachusetts ratification convention,
January 24, 1788) (emphasis added). Sedgwick's comment was made before the Second
Amendment was even proposed, of course, but like others of this era and afterwards, he clearly
assumes that individuals in a free state would possess or keep anns.
1 3 1 . A second reference in this debate to "keep anns" purponedly appears in the right to anns
provision of the Constitution ofthe Confederate States of America, .but is actually a mistranscription
ofthe original, which is also available for comparison on the relevant page.
132. I do nOI claim that "keep arms" couldnever be used in a military context, bUllhat any such
uses are rare and there are clear instances-for example, the Nassan and Belknap statements quoled
above--of "keep anns" referring to an individual right wholly apart from any active service in an
organized mililia. See supra notes 8 1 & 89 and a\X:ompanying lext.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 134--37.
CONS TllUfION, AS RECOMM ENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA,

262

Texas Law Review

[Vol.

83:237

concerned the right to anns, the phrase "bear anns" was deemed perfectly
appropriate.
On June

28, 1 856, Representative Alexander H. Stephens proposed a

comprehensive list of individual rights as part of a lengthy amendment to the
pending bill admitting Kansas into the Union, which stated: "And be it
further enacted . .
10

[tJhe people ofsaid Territory shall be entitled to the right
keep and bear arms, to the liberty of speech and of the press, as defined in
.

the constitution of the United States, and all other rights of person or prop
,,134
No mention is made of the
erty thereby declared and as thereby defined.
militia, and a militia preface like that found in the Second Amendment is
absent. "Bear anns" is clearly being used in a nonmilitary context.
In

1861, Representative Clement Vallandigham of Virginia announced

his intention to introduce the following legislation, the specific nature of
which is not specified:
A bill to regulate and enforce the writ of habeas corpus, and for the
better securing the liberty of the citizens;
Also, a bill to enforce the right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
Also, a bill to secure to the people the right to keep and to bear anns
for their defence;

Also, a bill to prescribe the manner of quartering soldiers in private
houses in time of war;
Also, a bill to secure the freedom of speech and of the press.

135

Here too, any militia preface is omitted, and "bear anns" is nonmilitary.
In

1 864, Garrett Davis of Kentucky introduced a resolution containing

the following in the Senate:

14.

. . . That the present executive government of the United States

has subverted, for the time, in large portions of the loyal States, the
freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, and free suffrage, the
constitutions and laws of the States and of the United States, the civil
courts and trial by jury; it has ordered . . . arbitrary arrests by military
officers, not only without warrant, but without any charge or
imputation of crime or offence; and has hurried the persons so arrested
from home and vicinage to distant prisons and kept them incarcerated
there for an indefinite time; some of whom it discharged without trial,
and in utter ignorance of the cause of their arrest and imprisonment;

and
to be tried and punished without law, in violation ofthe constitutional
guarantee to the citizen of his right to keep and bear arms, and of his
and others it caused to be brought before courts created by itself,

134. H.R. J., 34th Cong., lSI Scss. 1126 (1856) (emphasis added).
135. H.R. J., 37th Cong., lSI Sess. 102 (1861) (emphasis added).
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rights of property . . . ; all of which must be repudiated and swept
away by the sovereIgn peapIe. '"
The militia is not mentioned in the litany of alleged violations of individual
and personal rights contained in this resolution. The context is entirely
nonmilitary.
On April 19, 1872, President Grant addressed Congress in a lengthy
message regarding the lawless activities in certain portions of South
Carolina. The President listed numerous deprivations of individual rights
arising "under the sway of [a] powerful combination[], properly known as
[the] 'Ku-Klux-Klan[],' the objects of which were, by force and terror, . to
,
deprive colored citizens of the right to bear anns . . . , 137 Clearly. this refer
ence to a right to bear arms, unaccompanied by a right to keep arms, is out
side the militia context. Such abuses of the privileges and immunities of citi
zens of the United States 138 is what motivated Congress to propose the
Fourteenth Amendment. 139
True, all these nonmilitary uses of "bear arms" occurred long after the
founding, but any assertion that the meaning of "bear anns" had changed at
some unspecified interval assumes what must be proved: that the phrase
"bear arms" had at the founding an exclusively military meaning-especially
when conjoined with a right to keep anns-that was subsequently broadened
to include nonmilitary usages as well. Evidence that such a change occurred
is nonexistent.
In this regard, it bears rcpeating that neither the authors nor Garry Wills
present a single example of any person from the founding era or immediately
thereafter who suggested that the right to "keep and bear arms" was
exclusively a military right. While there are numerous examples of the right
being used more broadly, such as the statements by Nasson and Belknap
quoted above, 140 there is no record of anyone at the time asserting that the
right in the Second Amendment was as narrow or conditioned as the authors
claim. Three types of statements could directly support their empirical claim
that the original meaning of the right to keep and bear arms was exclusively a
military one:
(a) A statement opining that the right to keep and bear arms in the
Second Amendment is conditioned on the continued existence of an
organized militia; and
(b) A statement explicitly rejecting the importance of an individual
right to keep and bear arms, independent of an organized militia; and
.

.

.

.

136. SEN. J., 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 53-54 (1864) (emphasis added).
137. President Ulysses S. Grant, Address Before Congress (Apr. 19, 1872) (emphasis added), in
H.R. J., 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 716 (1872).
138. See infra nOles 160--73 and accompanying texl.
139. MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRJDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE BILLOF RIGHTS 71-72 ( 1986).
140. SeesllpranOles 81 & 89.
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(c)

A statement decrying the Second Amendment for having rejected

the individual right to keep and bear arms for one's own self-defense as well
as the common defense, in favor of a purely militia-conditioned right.
No such statements are presented. Had Uviller and Merkel done so, it
would have made them the first anti-guo-rights scholars to have produced
direct evidence of anyone actually holding the view that they claim everyone
141
At this point no such direct evidence is known

(or nearly everyone) held.
to exist.
HI.

The Structure of the Text
None of the discussion in Part n is intended to suggest that the term

"bear arms" did not also include a military connotation; rather, it is intended
only to establish that the term had a broader meaning that the public would
reasonably have attributed to the tenn unless it was expressly qualified,
which the Senate declined to do. In addition, Part

II

illustrates that the right

"to keep" anns had no obvious military connotation. If it establishes nothing
else, the evidence presented in Part II shows that the unconditioned individ
ual-rights interpretation of the amendment can be found in the historical
record and is no invention of the NRA-an organization that Uviller and
l42
Merkel mention derisively --or of individual-rights scholars, who the au
,,143
thors repeatedly disparage throughout the book as "advocates
or worse,
144
rather than historians.
At its root, and despite the pages of historical narrative, Uviller and
Merkel's argument that the Second Amendment fell silent is not based on
any new or direct evidence of original meaning. Apart from ritualistic invo
cations of "historical context," and various assertions about the meaning of
"bear anns," the authors' argument rests almost entirely on their own analy
sis of its wording.

"[A]s a matter of textual analysis," they contend, "we

regard it as highly significant that of the several great entitlements enunciated
in the first eight Amendments, no other is hedged by a
145
explanative c1ause."

conditional

or

Elsewhere they claim: "We have . . . a clear and unequivocal expression
of the linguistic context of the primary right in the introductory phrase that
,,146
Obviously this is wishful hyperbole. If the right to anns
accompanies it.
had been made explicitly conditional on participation in the militia, we

141. E.g., UV1LLER & MERKEL, supra nOle I, al 109 (''To the ratifiers, the right to keep and
bear arms was ineXtricably and exclusively bound 10 the maintenance ofa militia . . . .j.
142. Id. at 205.
143. {do al246 n.9.
144. See infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
145. Id. at 23 (emphasis added); see also id. at 35 ("(Hlistorical developments have altered a
vital condition for the articulated right 10 keep and bear arms.") (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
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would not be having this debate.

265

The authors claim that the Second

Amendment "guaranteed the right to keep and bear arms

in the mililia, 147
..

but the last three qualifying words simply do not appear there or elsewhere.
At onc point Uviller and Merkel go so far as to claim: "Had the two

statements-regarding the importance of a militia and the right to arms-not

been joined in this manner, it might have been possible to argue that even if

the first declaration ceases to be true, the second is undiminishcd."148

Yet

nonc of the precursors of the Second Amendment-including Madison's

proposal to Congress-are worded in the grammatical fashion that the au

thors find so significant. 149 This does not prevent them from insisting, with
equal ardor, that these fonnulations too "expressly linked" the right to anns
I O
to militia service. S

The Founders, however, were quite capable of expressly qualifying an

individual right-indeed of qualifying a right by military service. They did

just this in the Fifth Amendment when they specified the individual right not
to be prosecuted without an indictment by the grand jury "except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
time of War or public danger."ISI

in actual service in

In other words, unlike the Second

Amendment, the Fifth Amendment right to an indictment

is expressly

conditioned on whether or not a defendant is in actual militia service. And as
already noted, the Senate rejected the proposal that would have expressly
qualified the exercise of the right to be "for the common defence."m

Eugene Volokh has chronicled how prefacing constitutional rights with

affinnations of purposes was quite common in state constitutions of the

day.1S) For example, the New Hampshire Constitution of

1783 read: "The

Liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a State; it ought,
I
therefore, to be inviolably preserved." S4 Lest any weight be placed on the

147. Id. at 1 14 (emphasisadded).
148. Id. at ISO.
149. &e supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text; I ANNAUI OF CONGo (Joseph Gales ed.,
1789), reprin/ec/ in BENNETT B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOITEN NrNTH AMENDMENT I I I (1955)
(''The right of the people to keep and bear anns shall not be n
i fringed; a well armed and well
regulated militia being the beSt set:urity of a free counlly: but no person religiously scl1.lpulou$ of
bearing anns shall be compelled 10 render military service n
i person.).
150. UVILlER & MERKEL, supra note I, al 83 (referring to the proposal by North Carolina al
the ratification convention).
IS I. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
152. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, al 103.
153. Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793, 793-95
(1998) (explaining thaI these clauses "shed some light" on the Sewnd Amendment in that Ihey (I)
show that the Second Amendment is fairly tommonplate, rather than strikingly odd; (2) rebul the
claim that a right expires once its justification expires; (3) show that operative clauses are often

"both broader and narTOwer than their justification clauses,'" IlOt dependent on the right's
furtherance of its justifICation clause; and (4) '"'poinl to how the two clauses might be read together
without disregarding either'').
154. N.H. CaNST. Of 1783, an. XXII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE Blu. Of RIGHTS, supra nOle

43, at 94.
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use of a semicolon, the nearly identical passage from the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780 reads: "The Liberty of the Press is essential to the
security of freedom in a State, it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this
Commonwealth. "ISS
The authors note these state constitutions but dismiss this evidence on
the sole ground that "the Second Amendment remains unique among the
federal Bill of Rights."l S6 But this misses the significance of Professor
Volokh's justification-clause evidence for the original public meaning of the
Second Amendment. These state-constitutional-rights provisions show that
"to eighteenth century ears" (using the authors' phrase), 1 S7 such language was
not uncommon and, so far as we know, was not elsewhere interpreted to limit
or condition the right that followed. The authors' denials notwithstanding,
this evidence does indeed bear on the original public meaning of the Second
Amendment.
None of this is to suggest that the authors' purely textualist analysis is
absurd. To the contrary, it is the most plausible argument that the gun-rights
opponents have raised to date because they finally concede that the right was
ISS
But neither is their
one held by individuals and not by state governments.
analysis compelling. The fact that the right to bear and keep arms was not
expressly conditioned on the Second Amendment's preface strongly suggests
that it was not so conditioned. It is precisely when plausible doubts are
raised about the proper interpretation of text that evidence of original public
meaning becomes important. As we have seen, ample evidence exists to
suggest that the right to keep and bear anus existed apart from active service
in a militia for the common defense, and reasonable members of the public
would have and did so read it. IS9
Even if Uviller and Merkel are correct that the right to keep and bear
anns is conditioned on the continued existence of a general militia-of-the
whole, this raises the question of whether they are also right to claim that
such a militia no longer exists, a claim to which I shall return after briefly
considering two other problems with their treatment.
IV. Was the Right to Keep and Bear Anus Among the Privileges or
Immunities of Citizens?
Whatever its proper scope, the right to keep and bear arms (like the rest
of the Bill of Rights) was originally meant solely as a constraint on federal

155. MASS. CONST. of 1780, an. XVI, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note
43, at 94.
156. UVlLLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 24.
157. Cf id. at 156 ("twenty-first-eenJUIy ear.,").
158. See supra note 9 and aecompanying le)(l.
159. See supra Pan II.
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power; state power was not affected by its adoption. This structural feature
of the original Constitution was fundamentally altered by the enactment of
the Fourteenth Amendment. which dictates that "[0]0 State shall make or
enforce any law which shaH abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States

.

.

. .

,,160 Was the right to bear anns among these privi

leges or immunities?

Uviller and Merkel vehemently deny this possibility.1 61 Textually, they

argue that because the Fourteenth Amendment does not specifically refer to
the right to keep and bear arms as a protected privilege Of immunity. the
6
Amendment does not protect this righl.1 2 Of course no particular right is
specified as a privilege or immunity, so this first objection would wipe the
clause from the Constitution entirely.
cious five·to·four decision in

Even the Supreme Court in its atro·

The Slaughter-House Cases did not go so far as

to suggest that the clause had no application whatsoever.16J
Understanding the original meaning of ''privileges or immunities"
requires evidence of public meaning. lIS' Unfortunately, the authors rely for
their evidence solely on the work of Raoul Berger.165

While Berger never

made up evidenc�. as did historian Michael Bellesiles,l66 a researcher should

[60. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV, §

I.

161. In addition to the textual and historical arguments discussed here, Uviller and Merkel also

stress !he fact that courts have uniformly refused to incorporate a personal right to arms into the
Fourteenth Amendmcnt. UVILLER & MERKEL,

supra note I, at 198-99, 208. The principal purpose

of this dcbate over the meaning of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, howeve:r, is to discern
if this judicial stane:e: has been correct.

162. Jd. at 197-98 ("Regardless of the intentions--cven the clearly expressed inte:ntions-of
individual Framers, it is the text as ratified that counts, and the text of the Fourteenth Amendment

(of course) does not �l1ect any such purpose."); id. at 198 ("Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment does

not proclaim, 'The Bill of Rights, includmg a personal right to arms for private purposes such as
self-defense, shaH apply against the states.''').
163.

See 83 U.S. 36, 79-80 (1872) (citing as privileges of citizens of the United State:s the

rights "to peaceably assemble and petition for red�ss of grievances, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus" among others). I eritically examine the majority opinion in Randy E. Barnett, The

Proper Scopeo/lhe Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 429, �8 (2004).
164. BARNETT, REsTORING, supra note 9, It 89- 130.
165. See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 200 ("tndeed, Professor Raoul Berger �minds
us

that the derivalion of the phrase 'privileges and immunities' strongly suggests that it refem:d

only to rights of trade and eommerce."); id. It 205-06 (citing K(t]he eminent legal historian,

Professor Raoul Berger{'s]" conclusion that "the first

usc

of the term-in the Articles of

Confederation-made it pretty plain that the privileges �fern:d to were privileges of trade and
commercc:'1; id. at 3 1 3 n.120 (attributing to Raoul Berger "a powerful counterargument, p�senting
convincing evidence that Howard and Bingham spokc

inconsistently, that they fr�ucntly

contradicted themselves, that most members of Congress expressly rejected these views, and that

Howard and Bingham did not command the respect of the mlinstream of the Republican pany")

(citing RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 182-85 (2d ed. (997» .
166. �e James Lindgren, Fall From Groce: Arming America and Ihe Bellesiles Scandal, I I I
YALE L.J. 2195 (2002) (book review) (pointing out 8ellesiles's fabrication of evidencc); James
Undgren & JUSlin Lee Heather, Counting GUIU in Early America, 43 WM. &. MARY L. REv. 1177,
1839-49 (2002) (demonstrating how Bellesiles rnisTeported the probate rewrds on which he

purported 10 rely and that somc of the probate records he claimed to have examined do not exist);
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In this case, Uviller and

Merkel fail to address Michael Kent Curtis's refutation of Berger's thesis in

No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights,
an especially influential book that was also published by Duke.161 Though
not every scholar has been completely persuaded by Curtis's refutation of
Berger's thesis, his conclusions have been widely accepted and have re
shaped the current debate over the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.168 Curtis has shown that the primary purpose of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause was to reverse

Bo"on

v.

Baltimorel69 and extend fed

eral protection against state violations of the rights contained in the Bill of
Rights, especially the right to keep and bear arms.!7(l The lack of any refer
ence to Curtis's work-together with the paucity of their own sources
severely

undermines

the

authors'

assertions

about

the

Fourteenth

Amendment.
Even if Uviller and Merkel were correct about the founding, by

1868

the individual right to arms was certainly not a militia-conditioned one, espe
cially as free blacks and southern Republicans suffered abuses at the hands of
As Chief Justice Taney's 1856 opinion in Dred Scott v.
Sanford reflects, the right to bear arms was the right "to keep and carry arms"
white militiamen.

see alsa Joyce Lee Malcolm, Review: Arming America, 79 TExAs L. REv. 1657 (2001) (lambasting

Bellesiles for "present[ing] a skewed and distoned selection of the records, misquot[ing]
contemporary statements and statutes, provid(ing] n
i accurate information, and repon(ing) erroneous
counts of the particular probate collections he specifically cites").

Though Uviller and Merkel's

book appeared after the disgraced Michael Bellesiles's scholarship began to be discredited, the
authors repeatedly cite and discuss his work with favor,

even

emphasizing at one point Bellesiles's

receipt of the now-revoked Bancroft Prize. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note

I, at 58-59, 143, 279

n.24, 286 n.78, 287 n.5, 292 n.54, 294 nn.55-57, 295 n.58, 298 n.20, 313 n.110 (all citing

Bellesiles's work); id. at 292 n.54 ("In his Bancroft Prize book Arming America . . . ."); Press

Release, Columbia University, Columbia's Board of Trustees Votes to Rescind the 2001 Bancroft
Prize (Dec. 16, 2002), at http://www.colwnbia.edufcu/newslOVI2IbancroftJrize.hunl (announcing
the December 7, 2002 vote to rescind the Bancroft Prize originally awarded to Michael Bellesiles
and reponing Bellesiles's violation of "basic nonns of acceptable scholarly conduct''). While the
authors acknowledge some of Bellesiles's now-vindicated critics in a footnote, in the SaD1e footnote
they minimize the Significance ofthe critics' contrary findings. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I,
at 292 n.54 ("Bellesiles's use of the probate data has come under severe scrutiny, and his findings
and methods have been sharply criticized . . . .
Bellesiles . . .

In the

However, other commentators . . . have defended

interest of fairness, t
i should be added that Bellesiles's I.:onclusions in Anning

America do not depend entirely,

or even

chiefly, on his analysis of probate data.'').

167. CURl1S, supra note 139, at 1 13-29.
168. See. e.g., Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory:
Reflections an Ackerman, Reconstrnction. and the Transformation of the American Constitution,

108 YALE L.l. 2011, 2022 (1999) (characterizing Curtis's contribution to the academic debate on

the meaning ofthe Fourteenth Amendment as "something pretty close to" certainty).
169. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).

170. CURTIS, supra oote 139, at 173-74.

In my writings,

I have shown how "privileges or

immunities" n
i clude the natural rights retained by the people as well as additional privileges

established by the Bill of Rights. BARNEIT, RESTORING, supra note 9, at 60-68. As the right to

keep and bear arms is included n
i the Bill of Rights, however, it is wmecessary to accept this
historical daim to agree that it was included among the privileges or immunities ofcitizens.
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wherever one went.111 Though Michael Curtis is no gun-rights advocate, he
repeatedly references statements that include the right to keep and bear anns
as among those rights protected by the Constitution,l72
Freedmen's Bureau Act of

For example, the

1866, approved by a supermajority of Congress

over Andrew Johnson's veto, provided that:
[T]he right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings

concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the

acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal,

including the constitutional right of bearing arms, shall be secured to
and enjoyed by all citizens of such State or district without respect to
race or color, or previous condition of slavery ,173
Uviller

and

Merkel

contend

that

the

militia-conditioned

"Second

Amendment, as adopted by the Founders cannot be surgically reconstructed
as a purely personal right, the 'militia' as referred to therein cannot be rede
,,
fined as bands of private citizens. 174 The copious historical evidence
reported by Curtis and others175 makes it clear, however, that the
"incorporation" of individual amendments from the original Bill of Rights
into the Due Process Clause is an anachronism. When it comes to the origi
nal meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the true issue is whether the

personal right of bearing anns was among the privileges or immunities of
citizens that no state could constitutionally abridge.

The overwhelmingly

enacted Freedmen's Bureau Act exemplifies the fact that by

1866 the protec

tion of the individual, non-militia-conditioned right to arms for personal
security was understood to be a privilege or immunity of citizenship.

V.

Is the Right to Arms Subject to Reasonable Regulation?
Uviller and Merkel repeatedly assert that finding the right to arms to be

an individual right unconditioned on the existence of the militia is a radical
claim because such a right would not be subject to reasonable regulation.

Thus, they refer to the individual-rights position as entailing an "unbridled
,,
,,
right, 176 an "absolute right, 177 "an individual entitlement immune from

171. 60 U.S. 393, 417 (1856).
172. CURTIS, supra note 139,at 52, 53, 56, 72,88, 104, I I I , 1 12, 138, 140-41, 164, 167, 17879, 187. 203, 217, & 238 (discussing references to the right to arms in the context of the drafting
and ratifying of the FouI1eenth Amendment).

173. 14 Stat. 176-77 (1866) (emphasis added). That the Act protected the right to bear anns
solely from discriminatory treatment does not detract from the conclusion that the right is clearly
among the privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

As Curtis has

explained, the Amendment protects the right both from laws that discriminate among the people and
from laws that abridge equally the privileges or immunities of all citizens. See CURTIS, supra note

139, at 1 15-20;see also BARNETT, RESTORING, SUpra note 9, at 195-96.
174. UVlLLER& MER.KEL, supra note l, at 201.
175. See. e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENfH AMENDMENT, AND THE
RIGHTTO BEAR ARMS, 1866-1876 (1998).
176. UVlllER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 9.
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,
government curtailment,, 178 an "unfettered general license to carry
,,
,
,,
weapons, 17!J an "unrestricted right to weapons, I80 an "individual license, ]81
,,
that "prohibits any interference ]82 with a right that would be "immune to
,
government restriction and reguiation,, 183 and "free of any government
control of arrns."I84
Despite these polemics, the authors know better. In a footnote referring
to Laurence Tribe, Akhil Amar, and William Van Alstyne, the authors ac
knowledge that: "Preeminently, three of the most respected members of the
orthodox legal academy to embrace an individual rights reading of the
Second Amendment emphasize that this right-like the other individual

rights protected in the first eight amendments-should be subject to
reasonable regulation."lss

Disturbingly, the authors fail to mentionl86 that

virtually all individual-rights scholars, including the others cited in the same

footnote, hold the position that an individual right may be subject to
regulation.187 Indeed, I know of no individual-rights scholar who claims that
the Second Amendment is any more absolute than is the First Amendment.
This unifonnity is evidenced by a

1993 advertisement taken out in

major journals by "Academics for the Second Amendment" and jointly
signed by most individual-rights scholars.

ISS

The text of this advertisement

appears in an article cited by Uviller and Merkel earlier in the same footnote
that concedes the reasonableness of Tribe, Amar, and Van Alstyne.'89 In this
article, which Uviller and Merkel find important enough to criticize else
where in their text, l90 the following sentence of the advertisement is
italicized: "Of course, the right /0 bear arms is no more 'absolute ' than is the

at II.
at 31.
Id. at 54.
ld. at 83.
Id. al 86--87.
Id. a1169.
Id. at I.
Id. a1 197.
Id. at 245 n.4 (citing Laureoce Tribe & Akhil Reed Amar, Well-Regulated Militias. and
More, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, al A31, and William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and
the Personal Right 10 Arms, 43 DUKE. L.J. 1236, 1253-54 (1994)).
IS6. See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 254 n.4; see also id. al 37 (describing the
ndividual-rights
i
view as holding thai ''now and forever, in military pursuits and all olhers, guns are
an individual entitlement inunune from government curtailment").
IS7. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1986, at 143, 145-46 ("(R]easonable gun controls are no more foreclosed by the
second amendmenl than s
i reasonable regulation of speech by the firsl amendment.").
188. An Open Leiter on the Second Amendment, NEW REpUBLIC, Mar. 15. 1993, at 15
(advertisement) (endorsing the individual-rights theory of the Second Amendment in a statement
signed by, among others, law professors Akhil Amar, Charles Cantrell, Robert ConIol, Raymond
Diamond, Nicholas Johnson, Sanford Levinson, and Nelson Lund).
189. UV1LLER& MERKEL, supra note I, at 244 n.4 (citing Barnen & Kates, supra note 23).
190. UVILLER & MERKEL, supro note l , aI30.
177.
118.
179.
180.
lSI.
IS2.
183.
184.
185.

Id.

ld.

The Right to Keep and Bear Arms

2004]

right to speak, to publish. or to assemble."

191

271

This advertisement merely

evidences the fact that most individual-rights scholars of the Second
Amendment hold a view that the authors mysteriously attribute only to Tribe.
Amar, and Van Alstyne.'92 For this reason, Uviller and Merkel are unable to

produce a single example of any individual-rights scholar who contends
otherwise.
One suspects that they omit this fact about other individual-rights

scholars-whom they never call "scholars," much less "respected"-so they
,,
can repeatedly belittle them as "advocates, 19l a "dedicated band of
,
,,
individual rights advocates,, I94 an "individual rights brigade [9S or "a
growing

entourage

Amendment."I96

of

individualist

Indeed when
,

Malcolm, whose book

interpreters

mentioning historian

of

the

Second

Professor Joyce

To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo

American Rightl91 was published by Harvard University Press, they go so far
as to mention that Bentley College, where she teaches, is "an undergraduate
,
business school in Massachusetts., 198 Though individual-rights scholars
have come to expect such cheap shots from their academic opponents, it still
disappoints.
At this point, some readers may be scratching their heads and
wondering, if an individual right to keep and bear arms is subject to
reasonable regulation, what is all the excitement about? Why do gun control
proponents not simply embrace the original meaning of the right and then
propose what regulations they wish? The answer is simple. Were they to do
so under current doctrine, such regulations would be subjected to the same

scrutiny as laws rcstricting the liberty of speech and the press.

Within the

modem theory of constitutional rights, as articulated in the famous Footnote
Fourl99 of United States v.

CaroJene Products Co.:

There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a

specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
1 9 1 . Barnett & Kates, supra note 23, at 1189 (quoting An Open Leller on lhe Second
Amemimem,supra note 188) (emphasis added).
192. UVlLLER& MERKEL, supra note
193. ld al246 n.9.

I, at 245 n.4.

194. ld at 38.
195. Id at II.

196. Id at 53; see also id at 178 ("[W]e think il regrettable that [Levinson's] unpersuasive
thesis has lent respectability to the outlaw libertarians who claim to be the legitimate guardians of
American freedom.").
197. MALCOLM, supra note 116.

198. UVTLLER & MERKEL, supra note

I, at 246 n.9.

199. THE OXFORD COMPANION TOTHE SUPREME COURT OFTHE UNITED STATES 306 (Kennit

L. Ha1l eI al. cds., 1992) (noting in an entry entitled "footnote four" that "[w]hat is probably the
most renowned footnote in Supreme Court history appeared in a case that would otherwise be
forgonen").
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amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.2OO

Despite this injunction, the Second Amendment has never been held by

the Supreme Court to be among those specific prohibitions that shift the pre
01
The centrality of the doctrine articulated in
sumption of constitutionality.2
Footnote Four to the modem theory of constitutional rights explains why

gun-control proponents have expended so much energy to show that the right
,,
to keep and bear arms is not "a specific prohibition of the Constitution 201proponents of gun control wish to avoid the scrutiny that Footnote Four
would require.

So here is the position held by individual-rights scholars that Uviller

and Merkel fail to acknowledge, much less meet: The fact that the Second

Amendment protects an individual right means only that the government

must establish the necessity and propriety of its regulations, much as it must

do when adopting time, place, and manner restrictions on the freedom of
speech.20J

Further, the individual right bars the complete prohibition and

confiscation of all private firearms suitable for self defense, a goal so radical
that most gun control enthusiasts deny favoring it.204 In other words, prop
erly construed, by permitting reasonable regulation while taking complete

prohibition off the table, an individual-rights reading of the Second

Amendment prevents rather than proposes a radical policy measure. This is
evidenced by the fact that on three occasions Congress has passed a statute
expressly recognizing the Second Amendment as protecting an individual

right, unconditioned on militia service.205

200. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added).
201. See Presser v. Illinois, 1 1 6 U.S. 252, 264-65, 267�8 (1886) (refusing to n
i corporate the
Second Amendment and other rights into the Fourteenth Amendment); William F. Lane, Public
EruWngerment or Personal Liberty? North Carolina Enacts a Liberalized Concealed Handgun
Statute, 74 N.C. L.

REv.

2214, 2225 n.76 (stating that, although Presser has never been overruled,

the Supreme Court has ncorporated
i
aspects of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments into

the Fourteenth Amendment). Federal appellate courtS have repeatedly held that the Second

Amendment does not apply to state and local gun control laws. See. e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47
F.3d 120, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1995); Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 965 F.2d 723,

729-31

(9th Cir.

1992); Quilici v. ViI1. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 269-71 (7th Cir. 1982).

202. For a critique of this modem thwry, see BARNETT, RESTORING, supro note 9, at 224-52.
203. See. e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (approving time, place, and
manner restrictions of speech only if they

"are

content-neutral,

are

nalTowly tailored to serve a

significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels ofcommunication").

204. Though the denial may be disingenuous. See Barnett & Kates, supra note 23, at 1254-59

(describing the prohihitionist agenda ofthe gun control movement).

205. Firearms Owners' Protection Act § i(b), Pub. L No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (''The

Congress finds that the rights of citizens . . . to keep and bear arms under the second amendment to
the United States Constitution [and other rights) . . . require additional legislarion to correct existing

firearms statutes and government policies."); Property Requisition Act of 1941, Pub. L No. 77-274,
55 Stat. 742 ("Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed . . . to m
i pair or infringe in any
manner the right of any individual to keep and bear arms . . . ."); Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866,
14 Stal. 176-77 (1866) (defining "aU laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty" to include

"the constitutional right of bearing arms"). See generally Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets
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VI. Is the Militia Gone?
Notwithstanding all the evidence presented above, suppose Uviller and
Merkel are correct in their claim that the right to keep and bear anns in the
Second Amendment was somehow conditioned on service in the militia.
Even were this true, their case would still depend on whether the "militia,"
properly defined. no longer exists. Therefore, Uviller and Merkel's next
most important claim after their assertion that the right to bear anns is condi
tioned on the continued existence of the militia, is that the militia has been
discontinued and thus the Second Amendment has fallen silent:
[W]ith no contemporary descendent to inherit the Framers' concept of
a republican militia, the incidental right of citizens to bear and to keep
the arms necessary to the life of such a militia has atrophied; it has
simply fallen silent in the midst of the tumultuous debate on the issue
206
in today's world.
How then do they define the term "militia"?
As we have recounted-and as all scholars agree-the founding
generation of Americans conceived of a militia as a group composed
of all free white males between eighteen and forty·five (except for the
conscientious objectors and others entitled to an exemption),
responding willingly, as needed, for the common defence, at the call
of local authority, and above all, as a viable alternative to the feared
207
standing army.
Now it is possible to quarrel with this definition. At the end, for
example, the authors seem to build into the definition of militia that "above
all" it must be a "viable alternative" to a standing army, suggesting that if an
entity is not a viable alternative then it is not truly a "militia." Ifby "viable
alternative" the authors have in mind something like an "effective
substitute," they cannot mean this seriously. Such a definition runs afoul of
the Constitution itself, which affirms both the existence of the militia and the
2os
power to create a standing army, as necessary for national defense.
In the
the Second Amendment: Declarations by a Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and
Bear Anns, 62 TENN.

L. REv. 597 (1995) (analyzing the congressional reaffirmations of the Second
Amendment).
206. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra nOle I, at 228.
207. [d. at IS7 (foolnote omitted).
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. IS (giving Congress the power "[t]o provide for calling forth
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress InSWTections and repel Invasions"); id. art. I,
§ 8, c1. 16 (giving Congress the power "(t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia''); id. art. I, § 8, cL 12 (giving Congress the power "[t]o raise and support Armies"); see id.
amend. V, cl. I (mentioning cases "arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger''). Uviller and Merkel acknowledge Congress's
Article I, Section 8 powers in their book, noting that "{ulnder the Constitution, then, Congress was
empowered to raise a professional army" and that "assuming Congress made such provision under
Article I, Section 8, Clause I 5, the President would be empowered to call up the several state militia
into the service of the United States to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress lnsurrections, and
repel Invasions." UVtLLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 77.
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Constitution, a well-regulated militia is clearly viewed as an auxiliary to a
standing army-the militia can be called into action either to augment the

army or to act in their stead when regular forces are preoccupied with other
209

maners or cannot be on the scene as fast as locals.

This caveat aside, Uviller and Merkel acknowledge, correctly, that the
original militia to which the Second Amendment refers is not the select mili
2lD
tia of the National Guard,
but instead is what they repeatedly caU the
,,2 1 1
"militia-of-the-whole.
Are they then correct to claim, as they do at
212
that the militia to which the Second Amendment re
considerable length,
fers no longer exists-"that there is no contemporary, evolved, descendent of
,, 213
the eighteenth-century 'militia" on today's landscape ?
It turns out that (if
one omits the unwarranted word "evolved" from this claim), according to the
current laws of the United States as enacted by Congress, the authors are
wrong.
Section

3II

of the United States Code, Title 10, entitled "Militia:

composition and classes," reads in its entirety as follows:
The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males
at least 1 7 years afage and, except as provided in section 3 1 3 of title
32, under 45 years ofage who are, or who have made a declaration of

(a)

intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female
citizens of the United States who are commissioned officers of the
National Guard.

(b)

The classes of the militia are -

(I)

the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard

and the Naval Militia; and

(2)

the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of

the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the
214
Naval Militia.

209. See U.S. CONST. art. t, § 8, c\. 1 5 (giving Congress the power "To provide fOTcalling fonh
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress InsUlTections and repel Invasions"); id. art. II,
§ 2, cL I ("The President shall be Conunander in Chiefof the Anny and Navy of the United States,
and of the militia of the severnl States, when called into the aClUal Service of the United
States; . . . .").
210. See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 141 ("As far removed as the Cold War National
Guard was from the militia described in the Second Amendment . . . . ).
2 1 1 . E.g., id. at 3 1 , 32, 71, 119, 125, 1 34.
212. Jd. at 109-44 (detailing the d(X;ay of the militia of 1789-1791 and the origin of the
organized militia of today).
213. /d. at 157.
214. 10 U.s.C. § 3 1 1 (2000) (emphasis added). It should be noted how similar this provision is
to the proposal by Henry Knox, which, as the authors note, "proposed to retain the militia-of-the
whole n
i theory, but to divide it up into three corps according to age-an advanced corps aged 1820, a main corps aged 21--45, and a reserve aged 46--59" with only the advanced corps receiving six
weeks of training per year. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I, at 71-72. Compare as well the
wording of this statute with that of the Militia Act of 1792 which defined "militia" to include (with
some nalTOw exceptions) "each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective
"
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So far as federal law is concerned, then, the militia-of-Ihe-whole continues to
exist
Given its obvious relevance to their central claim, what do the authors
say about this statute? Actually, they fail to mention it.2IS Though they note
the distinction adopted by statute in

1903 between the "active militia" and

"an unorganized militia (the non-enrolled male population between eighteen
,,
and forty_five), 216 they twice repeat a claim taken from a 19405 law review
artic1e,217 that in

1933 "Congress made the National Guard part of the regular

aony during peace as well as wartime . . . and erased the word 'militia' from

the War Department charts, changing the name of the supervisory agency to

National Guard Bureau,,,m So far as J know, this claim is not actually false,
but it certainly is misleading when used to suggest that the class of militia
defined by stature in

1903 as "unorganized militia" no longer exists as a

matter of federal law. To the contrary, we have seen that it continues to be
recognized in the United States Code.219
The authors might respond that this is not the "republican" militia that
they and the Founders had in mind: a "well-regulated" militia that is to be
properly trained and drilled.2M But the federal government retains the power
to train and discipline the militia ifit so chooses.221 What the federal govern
ment cannot do--if we are to rake the preface ro the Second Amendment
seriously-or at least what the federal government has not done, is abolish
the militia altogether rather than to leave it unorganized. Nor can Congress
abolish the individual right to arms simply by failing to well-regulate the
militia-of-the-whole.

states, resident therein, who s
i or shall be of the age of eighteen yea�, and under Ihe age of forty
five years." Unifonn Militia Acl of 1792, ch. 33, § I , I Stat. 271, 271,

repealed by Dick Act, ch.

196, 32 Stat. 775 (1903).

215. Without noting its continued existence in federal law, the authors do connect the "common

mililia" of the Founde� with "the unorganized militia": "In contrast to the National Guard, the
unorganized militia-the shadow of the common militia so extolled by the frame� of the Second
Amendment-has not been funded by Congress since at least 1903." UVlLLER & MERKEL,
note

supra
I, at 143. A lack of funding, however, does not cause the militia to evaporate; rather, the

militia is at present ''unorganized,'' as current federal law accurately describes it.
216. ld at 134.

217. Frederick Bemays Wiener, The Militia Clause o/the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REv. 181,

209 (1940).

218. UVILLER & MERKEL,

supra note I, at 33, 137, 243 n.99, 290 n.23 ("[LJawrnakers

'eliminated the word "Militia" from the War Department organization by changing the name of the
supervisory agency to National Guard Bureau."').
219. IO U.S.C. § 3 1 1 .
220. Indeed, the authors mentioned "trained" and "organized" in one o f their definitions of
"militia": "By militia is meant a trained, organized, and anned collection of qualified citizens, save
only those ofconscientious scruple and others exempted from service by their states, called together
from their normal pu�uits 10 respond 10 occasional and particular threats, internal or external, to

community peace." UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note I , .l1 228,

221. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 16 (granting Congress the power "[t)o provide for organizing,
anning, and disciplining, Ihe Militia''),
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The irony is that, although the authors' entire thesis depends upon the
presence in the Second Amendment of the militia preface, they fail to realize
that the preface, iftaken seriously, would constitutionally bar the abolition of
the militia-of-the-whole, thus fatally undennining their claim that the Second
Amendment has fallen silent.

No matter what Congress might do in the

future, the militia-of-the-whole would continue to exist in a constitutional
sense, despite its being unorganized and not well-regulated.
Much of their book is devoted to discussing the obsolescence of this
222
militia.
They devote chapters to its early

body-of-the-whole

ineffectiveness, for example, in stopping the British invasion of Washington
in 1812, colorfully noting that the British soldiers consumed the dinner at the
m
White House that had been prepared for President Madison and his wife.
As for today's militia, they write:
In the years since World War Ii, the role of a mass reserve in assuring
national security has seriously diminished in consideration of the
technical complexity of equipment and tasks required of a thoroughly
professional modem anny, and because nuclear deterrence has made a
mass war drawing on all the personnel reserve of the country unlikely.
The need for a whole nation in anns has-in all likelihood,
224
pennanently---disappeared.
"Indeed," they confidently assert, "it would be difficult to conceive of any
institution less necessary to the security of the fifty free states at the
m
beginning of the new millennium than the vanished common militia."
On September l I th of

2001 , however, the United States came under

aerial attack by planes piloted by foreign nationals.

Two planes struck the

World Trade Center, destroying it and, with it, thousands of innocent civil
226
Another struck the Pentagon, killing hundreds of members of
227
the armed forces.
A fourth plane, United Flight 93, was heading for the
228
nation's capital with the likely target being the White House
or the U.S.
ians inside.

Capitol building.

It was stopped from reaching its target, but not by the

Army, the Navy, or even the Air Force. Nor was it stopped by the National
Guard or the armed eonstabulary of the District of Columbia. After all, these
official personnel cannot be everywhere the nation is threatened. No, unlike

1812, this time the White House was saved from possible destruction by the
,,229
heroics of members of the "unorganized militia
who, after learning on

222. UV1LLER& MERKEL, supra note l,at ]7-144.
223.

Jd. at 120-21.

224. Id. at 142.
225. Id. a1 143.

226. NAT'LCOMM'N ONTERRQRlST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/1 1 COMMISSION REPORT

7-8 (2004).
227. Id. aI9-1O.

228. Id. a114.

229. 1 0 U.S.C. § 3 1 1 (2000).
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their cell phones ofthe attacks by other planes, acted in concert to protect the
capital from a second successful attack on the same morning, at the cost of
230

their own lives.

VII. Conclusion
Uviller and Merkel's book adds no new historical evidence to the debate
over the original meaning of the Second Amendment. Instead, resting their
argument almost exclusively on historical "context" and parsing of text, they
propose that the right to keep and bear arms was expressly conditioned on its
exercise as part of a militia that no longer exists. This interpretation is belied
by contemporaneous statements about the nature of the right and the meaning
231
of the Amendment before, during, and after its ratification,
by evidence of
233
232
by
later usage,
by the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,
23�
repeated affinnations by Congress,
and by the current statutes of the
m
United States,
Notwithstanding the authors' opinion that "it would be difficult to
conceive of any institution less necessary to the security of the fifty free
,2l6
states at the beginning of the new millennium,
than the now�disorganized
common militia, we may just need the militia again one day, as we did on
September I I th, When we do, it may well be under circumstances where it
would be better if its members have access to their own weapons to ann
themselves, Fortunately, as the evidence shows, the Founders had the fore
sight to enshrine an individual right of the people to keep and bear arms in
the Constitution when they added the Second Amendment. Though it has
217
often been ignored by courts,
and sometimes SQuelched by scholars like
Richard Uviller, William Merkel, or Gany Wills who wish that it was not
there, the Second Amendment has not been repealed and it has never fallen
silent.

230. NAT'L COMM'NON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON TIlE U.S., supra note 226, at 13. Lesi l be
misunderslood, I do not offer Ihis example 10 suggeSI that airplane passengers should be anned or
that a proper interpretation of the Second Amendment would make disarming them
unconstitutional. I offer it only 10 show that Uviller and Merkel are wrong 10 assert that, because
the nature of warfare has changed, the militia-of-the-whole is no longer, and will never again be,
needed to assist in providing for the common defense of the United States. At the least, reasonable
people can disagree with their claim.
23 L Seesupra subparts II(A}-(D).

232. See supra notes 61--68, 73-78, & IOS-13 and accompanying text.
233. See supra Pan IV.
234. See supra subpart II(E).
235. Seesupra PartV.
236. UVTLLER& MERKEL, supra note l , at I43.
237. For a recent example of a court asserting the militia-condilioned interpretation of the
Second Amendment, see Silveira v. Lockyer, 3 1 2 F.3d 1052, 1060--6 1 (9th Cir. 2003) (as amended).
The opinion in Silveira had 10 be amended to correct its original reliance on the discredited work of
Michael Bellisiles. Siiviera v. Lockyer, 2003 Cal. Daily Op. Servo 800 (9th Cir. 2003).
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